The logic of modernity

At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. ~Planned Parenthood v Casey

I believe that I've written explicitly enough that the killing of George Tiller was murder, and that it was both evil and foolish for Roeder to do so. That being said, let us reason together.

The quote above is, as stated, from the decision in the Supreme Court case Planned Parenthood v Casey. That means, at least insofar as the present day workings of the legal system of these United States goes, that the quoted position is to be taken as a basic principle contained in and protected by the Constitution of the United States. Now assume the following: Roeder defines human life in such a way that abortionists are not included under it, or at least under the category of human life whereby one is protected by a right to not be killed. Or assume Roeder defines the universe in such a way that it is a moral imperative for abortionists to be killed because of what they do. Or assume both, or any similar type of position, or every similar type of position.

Under such an assumption, how can Roeder be prosecuted for murder? He has a basic Constitutional right to define these things for himself, and to do so without any compulsion from the State. That compulsion obviously includes using laws against his position to punish him. This is the same logic that says abortion must be legal, else we would we using "compulsion" to define things like life for people and thus denying them their liberty. If Roeder holds any position similar to the ones given above, then he should be immune from prosecution under the Constitution of the United States as authoritatively interpreted by the United States' Supreme Court.

In other words, the logic of modernity and basic consistency demand that Roeder be free from prosecution by the State. If they were truly consistent, then pro-aborts would be decrying Tiller's murder, but at the same time they would be decrying any attempt to prosecute Roeder. They would admit that they do not like the murder of abortionists. But the answer to that is simple: if you don't like abortionists being murdered, then don't murder one. They would reach across the aisle, extending hands of peace and cooperation, so that both pro-lifers and pro-aborts could work together to make the murder of abortionists safe, legal and rare.

This is what logic would demand. Moderns love to claim the mantle of logic and reason. Let us see if any actually follow their first principles were logic leads.

Join me now for 'Nonsense on stilts,' or 'Let's slander the Domincans!'

Hail, O Reproof of foolish philosophers! ~Akathist Hymn to the Virgin Mary

In which we examine the following article:

"The Death of Conscience," by Shadia B. Drury.

Article © either its author or the Council for Secular Humanism, quoted under fair use for purposes of review and critique.

It would seem that: "In 1232, Pope Gregory IX established a system of 'legal' investigations to stamp out heresy. The Dominicans (Domini Canes, or Hounds of the Lord) were granted the exclusive 'privilege' of conducting the Inquisition."

Sed contra: The scare quotes around the word "legal" are not an argument. Rather, they are a piece of empty rhetoric. And Pope Gregory actually had the authority to establish the system he so established.

Moreover, to say that the name "Dominicans" (Latin, "Dominicani") literally means "Hounds of the Lord" (Latin, "Domini Canes") is an error. The history of calling the Dominicans the Hounds of the Lord is more complicated. To wit:

St. Dominic founded the Order of Friars Preachers (Latin, "Ordo Fratrum Praedicatorum") or, more simply, the Order of Preachers (Latin "Ordo Praedicatorum"). This is why Dominican religious have the abbreviation "O.P." after their names. The order was and is commonly referred to as the Dominican Order, or simply the Dominicans, after their founder.

Now, St. Dominic was a faithful son of the Church who preached against heresy, converting and returning many souls to the Church. His order took after his example, thus becoming known for their excellent preaching and learning, as well as their orthodoxy and faithfulness to the Church. Since they were faithful to the Church, as a good dog is faithful to its master, a pun was made out of the name they were commonly called, viz. "Dominicani." E.g.: "Dominicani? Domini Canes! Hahahahaha!!"

However the story behind the pun is yet more complicated. For St. Dominic's mother, Blessed Joan, experienced a vision while pregnant with him. In this vision she saw a faithful dog who lit the world afire with a torch in his mouth. From which she realized that her son would be a faithful son of the Church who would set the word afire with his preaching. And so she named him Dominic. From which follows his order being commonly referred to as the Dominicans. From which we get the pun on the Latin for "Hounds of the Lord." So it is difficult to say whether the pun came about due to Blessed Joan's vision, or whether it simply developed from the name, and was thus only founded in the vision because it was from the vision that St. Dominic, and thus his order, was named.

If, however, you do not believe the story of Blessed Joan's vision, then you have no ground for saying that the name of the order is in any way derived from the Latin "Domini Canes" as the article does.

It would seem that: "If you heard a knock on your door in the middle of the night and you opened it to find a Dominican friar, the chief of police, and a few armed guards, then you were doomed."

Sed contra: I suppose this may have happened, somewhere, at some point, maybe. But I once read a medievalist who said that, for most people, the Inquisition coming to town meant a Dominican would preach a sermon against heresy and settle down to hear confessions. Hardly the same as the Gestapo or a Stalinist purge.

It would seem that: "When the Inquisitors arrived in a town, the local people were given a period of time to confess or inform on their neighbors. The informers were assured total anonymity. This presented a golden opportunity for grudge informers, scoundrels, and villains of every stripe.... Witnesses for the defense were prohibited; only witnesses for the prosecution were allowed. You could not have legal representation. You had no right to ask what the charge was and no opportunity to discover the identity of your accusers."

Sed contra: The attempt to judge the Inquisition by the rules of modern liberal jurisprudence is invalid, since modern liberal jurisprudence is not the only way to to have a just trial. It is true that one did not get to know the identity of one's accusers. It is equally true that the testimony of anyone the accused named as an enemy was thrown out, and that it took more than one accusation to bring a person to trial. This could be considered in some ways superior to modern liberal jurisprudence, in which an enemy of the accused could give testimony against them, and whether or not they were lying would have to be determined by the judge or jury based upon the demeanor of the witness and the examination skills of the prosecutor and the defense attorney.

It would seem that: "Hooded Dominicans were prosecutors, judge, and jury."

Sed contra: As opposed to hooded Franciscans or hooded Benedictines? The hood is a standard part of the religious habit of many orders of monks and friars. Mentioning it to make the friars seem like scary, scary men is an empty bit of rhetoric.

Moreover, there is nothing necessarily unjust about these men all being from the same order. Today many prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges have attended the same law schools, worked together at some time or another, are friendly in their off hours &c. This does not necessarily make them unable to do their job without conspiring together.

It would seem that: "If you did not confess at first, you were tortured. If the torture did not make you confess, you were deemed to have the assistance of the Devil—and that was also proof of your guilt."

Sed contra: I am certain that this--i.e. guilty if you confessed, guilty if you didn't--is a malicious falsehood. If it is true I will need more evidence than the word of an obviously hostile opponent. In an Inquisitorial court, the author could have been named as an enemy and her testimony would be thrown out. So I suppose an Inquisitorial court had higher standards of justice than the court of public opinion or the editors of the Council for Secular Humanism's website.

On torture: I am opposed to torture. I reject the current policy of the U.S. government towards water-boarding &c. That said, it seems that for the sake of moral clarity a proper definition of torture is needed.

Now, most people agree that there is a difference between performing the physical action of water-boarding on a willing trainee, who placed himself in the care of the instructors who are going to perform the physical actions on him, and performing the physical action of water-boarding on a prisoner who has done no such thing. It must be kept in mind that the object of an act must be considered from the point of view of the agent. Also keep in mind that certain relationships between people are not simply circumstances, but are part of the object of the act. An example that should be obvious to my fellow Catholics: If a man has sex with his betrothed on the night before the wedding, they have committed an objectively evil act of fornication. If he has sex with his wife the night after the wedding, they have committed an objectively good act of marital love. Yet the only thing that has changed is the relationship that exists between them. Thus at least some relationships affect the objects of human actions.

Now, keeping that in mind, I have defined torture as such: Torture is any act that causes pain to the subject of the action where no relationship exists between the agent and the subject that would guaranty the subject protection from per se harm.

Now, assuming that my definition is adequate, the question before us is this: "Do the physical interrogation techniques applied by the Inquisition count as torture?" I will be honest in saying that I do not know for certain. They might have at some time or for some people and not at other times for other people. I will, however, note that many criminals being held by the secular courts would openly blaspheme and make heretical statements with the hope of being transferred to the Inquisitorial courts. This is because the Inquisition, unlike the secular courts, had a strict limit on the amount of physical interrogation that could be applied at any one time, as well as the number of times it could be applied. Whether or not this meets the criteria of "a relationship that exists between the agent and the subject that guaranties the subject protection from per se harm" is something I will have to think about.

It would seem that: "If you were obstinate, your children could be tortured until they became witnesses against you."

Sed contra: Again, I will need more evidence than the word of an obviously hostile witness with an ax to grind before I believe this.

It would seem that: "In 1252, Pope Innocent IV made torture an official policy of the Catholic Church in his bull, 'Ad extirpanda.'"

Sed contra: This bull also limited its use. And, for reasons stated above, it is possible that the physical interrogation techniques used did not count as torture per se.

It would seem that: "The Inquisitors were allowed to torture boys of fourteen and girls of twelve years of age."

Sed contra: Assuming this is true, one must note the fact that said boys and girls were well on their way to being considered adults at the time, if they weren't considered so already. They had adult responsibilities. They were capable of bearing children and were thus capable of marriage (Cf. Summa theologiae, Suppl., q. 58, a. 5c). The fact that in the modern world people of such ages are so immature as to be considered children does not make it so for all times and all places.

It would seem that: "The Hounds of the Lord were so totally shameless that they saw no reason to conceal their crimes. They were doing the work of God and 'his Holiness.' As a result, 'trials' and burnings were done in broad daylight."

Sed contra: This is just foolish. The scare quotes around the word "trial" are another piece of empty rhetoric. As for having public trials, many trials are public even today. The complaint that executions were public ignores the fact that most all execution were public in those days. And I can think of no reason why public executions should be considered objectively immoral. That they offend modern liberal sensibilities isn't enough.

It would seem that: "Not surprisingly, the Dominicans were reviled by ordinary people whose consciences were not destroyed by the propaganda of the Catholic Church. In 1253, one of the pope’s Inquisitors was torn to pieces by a mob in northern Italy. One year after his death, the victim was canonized as St. Peter of Verona."

Sed contra: St. Peter of Verona was not killed by a mob. He was killed by assassins hired by Cathars who were angered by the effectiveness of his preaching. His assassin later converted to the Catholic faith and became a Dominican himself.

It would seem that: "Thomas Aquinas was fully aware of the hostility of the people toward his fellow Dominicans. When Aquinas arrived in Paris in 1245, the friars could hardly venture out of their monastery for fear of insults and assault. The royal troops of King Louis IX (St. Louis) had to guard the monastery at St. Jacques, where Aquinas was staying."

Sed contra: I can find no information about supposed fear of attacks or the need for King St. Louis IX to provide troops to protect the friars. I have read nothing about this in any of the many biographical studies on St. Thomas that I have read. But assuming it is true, hostility in Paris had little or nothing to do with the Inquisition. The secular masters of Art and Theology at the University of Paris were hostile to both the Dominicans and the Franciscans both because the mendicant orders were new and different and, more importantly, because the members of said orders were simply better at reasoning and argument than the secular masters were. It was a matter of the distrust of the new mixed with professional jealousy. See St. Thomas' defense of the rule of his order and its comparison to other ways of life in Summa theologiae, II-II, qq. 179-89.

It would seem that: "Nevertheless, Aquinas was a vociferous defender of the Inquisition. He thought that it was absolutely necessary and that its activities were morally right. He compared heretics with germs that infect the community of the faithful and threaten their salvation. He quoted St. Paul, saying, 'Know you not that a little leaven corrupts the whole lump?' He did not think that it was enough to kick the heretics out of the Church. He insisted that they must be 'severed from the world by death' (Summa Theologica II-II, Q. 11, A. 3). He quotes Saint Jerome: 'Cut off the decayed flesh, expel the mangy sheep from the fold, lest the whole house, the whole paste, the whole body, the whole flock, burn, perish, rot, die.'"

Sed contra: I do not deny that he said this, I simply deny that it is objectively evil or unjust. Moreover, this quote is pertinent, and yet skipped for some reason:

On the part of the Church, however, there is mercy which looks to the conversion of the wanderer, wherefore she condemns not at once, but "after the first and second admonition," as the Apostle directs: after that, if he is yet stubborn, the Church no longer hoping for his conversion, looks to the salvation of others, by excommunicating him and separating him from the Church, and furthermore delivers him to the secular tribunal to be exterminated thereby from the world by death.

I will note two things: first, death was not the punishment for heretics who did not prove themselves to pernicious and unrepentant. Second, the penalty leveled by the Inquisition was not death, but rather excommunication. It was the a "secular tribunal," i.e. the state, that executed the heretic. But read the treatment in Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 11, a. 3 for yourself.

If one wants to argue that this is a distinction without a difference, since the state and the Church were one in the Middle Ages, I can only reply that such a remark can only be made by some one who is almost completely ignorant of the Middle Ages. The Middle Ages had plenty of strife between the authority of Church and state over any number of things. See, for example, the Investiture Controversy.

Moreover, the state punished heresy as it punished any other act of minor treason. Major treason was a direct attack on the authority of the state. Minor treason was an indirect attack on the authority of the state, viz. an attack on another authoritative institution, which was considered to encourage lack of respect for any authority whatsoever. For example, killing the head of one's household was an act of minor treason because it was an attack on the authority of the family and the household.

It would seem that: "Aquinas lost sight of the fact that the heretics were innocent people who were good neighbors and law-abiding citizens."

Sed contra: False. Heresy was a minor treason against the commonweal, since it endangered the souls of citizens and the stability of society. Unrepentant, pernicious heretics were and are worse than murderers, since a murderer can only kill what is lesser and passive in man, i.e. his body, which will be restored to him on the day of the resurrection anyway. A heretic kills what is higher and active in man, i.e. his soul, which once lost will never be restored. If lawful authority can justly execute a murderer, it can certainly justly execute a heretic.

It would seem that: "They harmed no one, were pale with fasting, had an intimate knowledge of the Bible, and were often better Christians than the pope."

Sed contra: This is a false picture of the Cathars. They were not modern day hippies or liberals. Even assuming that the truth of the matter falls somewhere in between statements like this and some of the more strident Catholic descriptions, the truth of the matter is that Cathar doctrine, in itself, was a danger to the state, especially their doctrine of cult suicide.

Moreover, the Cathars can in no way be considered "better Christians than the pope." Cathars were dualists, and as such were not only heretics but also apostates and non-Christians. Christianity is, by definition, non-dualist.

It would seem that: "In defending the Inquisition, Aquinas was defending the killing of innocents—with a clear conscience."

Sed contra: Heretics are not innocent, as was demonstrated above. Moreover, the Inquisition was not the body that executed heretics, as was also stated above. This statement is thus incorrect on at least two points.

It would seem that: "Catholic apologists shrug off the Inquisition by saying that every age has its atrocities."

Sed contra: I refuse to shrug it off. I believe that in general the Inquisition was just. That there were particular instances of injustice no more makes the Inquisition illegitimate than particular injustices in the U.S. legal system make it illegitimate.

It would seem that: "Every age does indeed have its atrocities, but no other age was blessed with a philosopher who was morally blind enough to defend its crimes."

Sed contra: Carl Schmitt.

It would seem that: "The moral blindness of Aquinas and his fellow Inquisitors transcends the callousness of the most spectacular secular criminals."

Sed contra: This is so utterly and obviously false that one cannot find the words to respond.

It would seem that: "Unlike Aquinas and his fellow Dominican Inquisitors, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (Lenin), the leader of the Russian Revolution, retained his moral sensibilities and did not display the same callous disregard for the killing of the innocent. Unlike Aquinas and the Catholic Church, Lenin recognized his actions as crimes; he had to make a conscious effort to harden his heart so he could carry them out.... He had no illusions about the wicked means involved in his project of world transformation. He recognized his crimes for what they were."

Sed contra: Putting aside the fact that St. Thomas' moral sensibilities were not only retained but correct, this is still an unbelievable statement. The idea that one who knowingly does evil is in any way the moral superior of one who does evil unknowingly strikes me as completely repugnant. The latter is mistaken, and so can possibly be argued out of his actions and lead towards virtue. The former has knowingly confirmed himself in vice by his own choices.

It would seem that: "Lenin loved listening to Beethoven’s Appassionata, but he did not allow himself this pleasure too often because the beauty of the music made him feel like patting everyone’s head."

Sed contra: And St. Thomas composed some of the most beautiful Catholic hymns ever when he composed the hymns for the feast of Corpus Christi. How is this at all relevant? Empty rhetoric again.

I am going to skip the next two paragraphs, as they argue that the Dominicans were also worse than the Nazis. I will simply note that the Nazi and Communist regimes, if we add up the people killed in the concentration camps, the people who died in the gulags, the people who were starved to death by engineered famine, the people who disappeared down the memory hole of Communist purges &c., then we have more people killed by secular regimes in the twentieth century than have ever been killed by Christians in the entire 2000 year history of Christianity. Thus to say, "in lethal doses, religion creates ogres that are greater than either Lenin or Himmler," is obviously false.

It would seem that: "Like the Islamic jihadists of our time, the Inquisitors were as self-righteous as they were callous and insensible. This leads me to conclude that in lethal doses, religion creates ogres that are greater than either Lenin or Himmler. It causes irreparable damage to the rational faculty and leads to the total death of conscience and the horrors it implies."

Sed contra: First, since St. Thomas' judgments were correct, as demonstrated above, his rational faculties were obviously working properly. Second, I deny that one can lay blame on the category of religion as a whole for the acts of a particular religion. The actions of jihadis are of an entirely different species than the actions of the Inquisition, most obviously because the latter were, in general, just while the former are not.

It would seem that: "When coupled with the powers of modern technology, the death of conscience is a menace that we cannot afford to ignore in this age of religious revival."

Sed contra: I agree completely with the sentiment that the death of conscience, when coupled with modern technology, is a menace that cannot be ignored. But said menace comes from both jihadis--with there terrorism--and secularist--with their false beliefs in "personal autonomy" that allow and encourage abominations such as abortion, embryonic stem cell research, homosexual "marriage" &c.--not religion qua religion.

A foolish "philosopher" in need of reproof*

Hail, O Reproof of foolish philosophers! ~Akathist Hymn to the Virgin Mary

Sedes sapientiae, ora pro me!

(With a tip o' the ol' beanie to The Sci Fi Catholic. His post on the issue first brought it to my attention.)

So apparently there is a Christian girl named Gina DeLuca. She attends school at Suffolk County Community College. She is taking an Introduction to Philosophy course. Apparently her "philosophy" professor has used the course as an opportunity to belittle her and her Christian faith and has, it seems, given her poor grades because of her faith. Needless to say, she contacted the American Center for Law and Justice to defend her freedom of religion and to seek a just grade.**

Now, I do not have enough information to competently judge Gina's performance in the course. Maybe the professor is a fool and at the same time Gina actually deserved to be graded poorly rather than the professor's foolishness causing him to act unjustly in giving her a poor grade. That is between Gina, the professor and the school; and now--for better or for worse--the legal system.

The ACLJ's letter to county attorney Christine Malafi can be found here. (WARNING! PDF!) The letter contains some choice quotes from the professor. These I do have the knowledge to competently judge. And so, in the interest of the truth of things and defending the faith, I shall.

To Gina's comment that she "can KNOW the material, without having to BELIEVE it," the professor responds as follows:

[I]t is clear that knowledge is linked to belief and that KNOWLEDGE is a justified true belief. If you do not believe that X is true then you can not claim to know that X is true. What you do is to deceive yourself and others by claiming that "I can KNOW the material, without having to BELIEVE it." What you do is MEMORIZE and REPEAT without understanding. You have no understanding of what it means to know something.***

This is obviously false.

In offering my critique of what the professor says, I will accept the definition of knowledge that he offers, viz. justified, true belief. But even with this definition of knowledge being accepted, the professor is still wrong. He is either guilty of the fallacy of equivocation or of holding to absurdity. The professor is either not addressing the same knowledge that Gina is or he is violating the principle of non-contradiction.

Gina is saying that she can know what a philosopher or school of philosophy taught without having to believe that said philosopher's or school of philosophy's principles, conclusions &c. are true. It is perfectly possible for Gina to believe that some philosopher or school of philosophy taught X, to justify her belief by the reading of primary and secondary sources and for her belief to be true. Thus she would have justified, true belief.

The professor is arguing that Gina cannot know some position of a philosopher or of a school of philosophy is true without believing it. This is equivocation, since it was not at all what she was talking about. Moreover, if the professor actually was talking about knowing what a philosopher or school of philosophy taught rather than knowing that what they taught was true, then his position is absurd. For example, one could not know both what Hegel taught and what Kierkegaard taught, since--according to what the professor has said--knowing what Kierkegaard taught would require holding his positions as true, while knowing what Hegel taught would require holding his positions as true. But this is an impossible absurdity, because Kierkegaard's teachings include teaching that Hegel was wrong! One cannot hold both that Kierkegaard's teachings are true and that Hegel's teachings are true, since Kierkegaard's teachings are that Hegel's teachings are false. One cannot hold both A and not-A at the same time and in the same respect, and that is exactly what the professor is arguing for if he is not equivocating!

The next quote from the professor states the following: "There are problems with any single being having all the properties traditionally assigned to the deity of the Western religions." He then goes on to give some examples of what he believes these "problems" are. There is nothing to indicate that he has any idea that these problems have been answered, nor to indicate that if he knew of these answers he engaged them in some way to show why he believes them to be false. Perhaps he has done so and this was simply not quoted in the letter. Since, however, the letter is all most of us will see of his thoughts on the subject, I will now attempt to answer them point by point.

Objection 1: "If the deity is ALL POWERFUL would it not have the power to create beings that would know what GOOD was without knowing or committing EVIL? If this is not possible then how is the being ALL POWERFUL?"

Reply to Objection 1: According to the Catholic tradition, God did exactly that. Our first parents, in their state of original justice, knew good and not evil. This is because they were human, and thus they had the power to possess intellectual knowledge. Now, that which is primarily known is being. And in knowing being, they also would come to know it as desirable, i.e. as good.

Now, evil is nothing except privation, the lacking of some good in a being that should have that which it lacks. Thus, evil is not being per se, but only per accidens, since it can only exist through something that has being.

Now, the professor is here speaking of moral evil. A moral evil is a human action that lacks the fullness of being proper to it. Ever action can be said to have being insofar as it exists, even though it exists per accidens. To deny that actions have being would be the equivalent of saying that no action ever existed. But if no action ever existed, then no effect of an action could ever exist. This is absurd, so we must admit that actions are beings. In their state of original justice our first parents had not yet committed any actions that lacked the fullness of being proper to human actions. Since evil only exists per accidens, it can only be known through that which exists per se, since that which exists per accidens only exists through that which exists per se. But until our first parents committed an action that lacked the fullness of being proper to human actions, no moral evil existed, since moral evil can only exist through some moral agency, viz. the moral agency of our first parents. Thus, until our first parents committed the original sin and lost for themselves and their posterity original justice, they knew the good, including moral good, without knowing moral evil.

Now, the professor seems to mean not only the actual knowledge or moral evil, but even the potential knowledge of moral evil, since he speaks also of committing evil. Why, if God is all powerful, did He not create beings who did not have the potential to commit moral evil?

To this we must reply as follows: to say that God is omnipotent is not to say that the divine power is capable of bringing into existence all that can be thought. It is to say that the divine power is capable bringing into existence all that is possible to be brought into existence. Now, those things which violate the principle of non-contradiction cannot be brought into existence, because that would require they both exist and not exist at the same time and in the same respect, which is absolutely not possible.

To create a moral agent that is incapable of moral evil would violate the principle of non-contradiction. To wit: A being either possesses its end, the fullness of its existence, its perfection either per se or per accidens. God is ipsum esse subsistens, the fullness of existence itself. Thus only He possesses the fullness of existence per se. All other beings must possess their end and perfection per accidens. This is because any being that is not its own act of existence is a being that receives existence limited by some potency. Now, that which has some potency is capable of possessing accidents. Thus, the perfection of a being that is not its own act of existence is through superadded accidents which actualize its potentialities in proper proportion to its nature. For example, man is perfected by acquiring those habits called virtues.

But insofar as a being is capable of possessing accidents of certain modes, it is not only capable of acquiring and possessing those accidents which bring about its perfection. It must also be capable of not acquiring those accidents that would bring about its perfection--as man is capable of not possessing grace--or of possessing accidents that are contrary to its perfection--as man is capable of possessing those habits called vices that are contrary to virtue. Thus any being that is not its own act of existence, that does not possess its perfection per se, must be capable of failing to achieve its perfection. Now, any limited moral agent possess potentiality insofar as it is limited. Thus any limited moral agent must not just be capable of acting to acquire the accidents that are its perfection, but also of acting in such a manner as to fail to acquire said perfecting accidents or to acquire their contraries. And thus the existence of a limited moral agent that is incapable of doing moral evil is a contradiction, since to be a limited moral agent is to be able to do moral evil by definition.

Now, the professor might ask "Why then did God not create unlimited moral agents?" But this to would be a contradiction. Beings are differentiated by their potency. A man, for example, is differentiated from other men by his particular matter. But matter is that which is in potency, since it is capable of receiving many different substantial forms. In the same way, immaterial beings are differentiated by their essences, since essence relates to existence as potency relates to act. Only God is unlimited and possesses no potency, since He is ipsum ese subsistens, the subsisting act of existence itself. For God to create another unlimited being would require that He create another being that possesses no potency, another God. But this is impossible, since the only way to distinguish between God the creator and the created God as different beings would be if the latter contained an admixture of potency. But any being with an admixture of potency is neither God nor unlimited by definition. Thus the creation of unlimited moral agents would violate the principle of non-contradiction, since said created unlimited moral agents would have to both possess potency and not possess potency at the same time and in the same respect.

Objection 2: "If the being must make EVIL to make GOOD then how is the being ALL GOOD?"

Reply to Objection 2: Good does not require evil to exist, but rather vice versa, as was explained above. This suffices to reply to the objection.

Objection 3: "If the being is ALL KNOWING and thus knows in advance that there will be a use of FREE WILL that produces EVIL and then goes and creates FREE WILL then the being has made EVIL and is not ALL GOOD."

Reply to Objection 3: The effect of a middle cause can only be reduced to the first cause insofar as said middle cause is subordinate to the first cause. Insofar as a middle cause goes outside the order of the first cause, the effects of said middle cause are reducible only to the middle cause, not to the first cause. For example, insofar as a student gains knowledge, said knowledge can be reduced to the teacher as first cause, since the teacher teaches in order to bring about knowledge in the student. But insofar as the student remains ignorant, said ignorance is reducible only to the student as cause, since the failure to gain knowledge is outside the order established by the teacher.**** Thus, since evil is, by definition, outside the proper order of things as established by God, evil cannot be reduced to God as cause, but only to the immediate agent.

Objection 4: "Another problem with the deity being ALL PERFECT is that the being would need to possess all perfections and if freedom is a perfection or a good thing as opposed to its opposite being not god [sic] then the deity that is all perfect would also need to be free and yet it cannot be free as it is not free to be or do anything that is less than perfect or the very best possible. As it cannot be free it is NOT ALL PERFECT."

Reply to Objection 4: This does not follow. Something is not said to lack freedom because it is not able to do what is not in its nature to do or be what is not in its nature to be. For example, man is not said to lack freedom because he is not capable of flight under his own power. Nor is man said to lack freedom because he cannot be a stone. Thus God cannot be said to lack freedom because He is incapable of doing what is not in His nature to do and being what is not in His nature to be.

Now, the professor might respond that this answer is opposed to the divine omnipotence, but this would be speaking falsely. As was stated above, the divine omnipotence consists in being capable of bringing into existence all that which is capable of being brought into existence. And as was also stated above, that which is not capable of being brought into existence is that which violates the principle of non-contradiction. For God to do what is not in His nature to do or be what is not in His nature to be would violate the principle of non-contradiction, since it would require Him to both be and not be God at the same time and in the same respect.

Here ends the professor's objections and my replies to them.

The professor states that "there are problems with the SET OF BELIEFS associated with the one deity of the Western religions." But if this is true it certainly does not follow from the arguments he has presented.

The final statement of the professor quoted in the letter is as follows:

Now for those who believe in the GOD of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition they must believe in a single being with characteristics of being: SUPREME, ALL POWERFUL, ALL GOOD, ALL PERFECT, ALL KNOWING, ETERNAL etc... Why must they? Well, because they have no choice either they believe in the GOD of those traditions or else they make up their own ideas and they are then actually moving out of those traditions and are giving good example of the post modern relativistic, subjectivist tradition of the Twentieth Century. The religions of the West have very clear ideas about the DEITY they have at the center of their beliefs. These religions have doctrines and dogma that the faithful must accept.

How would I respond to this?

I would agree with it. Insofar as I am Catholic "I believe and profess all that the Holy Catholic Church believes, teaches, and proclaims to be revealed by God." That is what it means to be Catholic. But what of it? Nothing about this makes what I believe absurd or illogical. The professor has certainly not, as far as I know, written anything that demonstrates my faith to be such. Indeed, in my own personal life I spent a large part of my undergraduate studies slipping away from the Catholic Church and the faith of my fathers because other things provided more immediate and powerful enjoyment. I was a deist at best, an agnostic at worst. It was not until I began the study of philosophy that I realized that the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church possessed the fullness of Truth. The idea that philosophy and reason are opposed to faith is absurd, as any competent study of the history of western philosophy would show.

I do not know if Gina has a case against her professor for being unjust in his grading. But she certainly has a powerful case for his being a fool.*****

* I say "philosopher" because error is not philosophy. It is rather the abuse of philosophy, as the Angelic Doctor says in his In Boeth. de Trin, q. II, a. 3c.

** N.B. Apparently the chief council for the ACLJ has come out in favor of waterboarding. This is bad, since torture is intrinsically evil (See Gaudium et Spes, 27; Veritatis Splendor, 80). It does not, however, undermine the justice of Gina's claim.

*** All formatting as in original letter.

**** This example assumes that the teacher truly and properly teaches.

***** "Fool" being taken in its philosophical definition, viz. "one who does not possess wisdom."

A Thought on the Second Greatest Commandment

"And the second is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (Matthew xxii.39).

"And as you would that men should do to you, do you also to them in like manner" (Luke vi.32).

The second greatest commandment, after "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind" (Matthew xxii.37), is the first quote at the beginning of this entry. The second quote is another statement of it, which, in this formulation, is often called the Golden Rule. I have been thinking about this commandment a bit.

Today people often toss his commandment around very haphazardly. You often hear it when you state the importance of passing laws to buttress certain moral principles and outlaw certain grave evils, or when you speak of the justice of a punishment. The implication is that if you were the person who wanted to do the immoral acts or who was going to receive the punishment, you would not want these acts proscribed or this punishment to be administered.

The error in this is the fact that the commandment is not simply subjective. It cannot be, for Jesus Christ is God, Who is the ultimate foundation of the true, the good and the beautiful. He is the way, the truth and the life (John xiv.6). He would not give a commandment that would lead to relativism. Rather, we must apply the commandment in accord with right reason.

This is why those I have previously mentioned argue falsely when they try to argue using this commandment. Because if the person whose acts are being proscribed or the person who is being justly punished were to view their situation with right reason, they would want the the help the law offered in overcoming their vice, they would want to be justly punished so as to expiate the evil their actions have caused.

If we want to be subjective about it, I can only look at my own life. There were a number of times those with authority over me placed restraints upon my actions or punished me for things I had done. At the time, of course, I would have said that I did not want these things to happen to me. But looking back now, when I am a little less of a fool--not much less certainly, but a little--I can see that these restraints and punishments helped in some way to discourage me of vice and form me, little by little, in the path of virtue. As such, if I ever have others under my authority in such circumstances, then I will do my best to prudently and justly restrain and punish those who need it. Because that is what I, insofar as I am thinking in accord with right reason, want others to do for me.

On the Use of Language as a Sign of Rationality

Here is a paper on the difference between the use of language by human beings and what appears to be the use of language by apes:

Dennis Bonnette, A Philosophical Critical Analysis of Recent Ape-Language Studies.

See also:

Walker Percy, Lost in the Cosmos: The Last Self-Help Book.

Idem, The Message in the Bottle: How Queer Man is, How Queer Language Is, and What One Has to Do With the Other.

Robert Sokolowski, Phenomenology of the Human Person.

The last book has not yet been released, but I was fortunate enough to take a graduate class with Msgr. Sokolowski where we used an earlier draft of it as our text.

Further references on the topic would be appreciated.