Gonna start a counter-revolution from my bed...

So, this post over at Mark Shea's blog got me thinking, "What do we conservatives really mean when we say, 'We need to return to those things which made America great: individual liberty and limited government'?"

Well, I don't know what everybody else means by them--though some seem to mean, "I can do what I want, and neither man nor law has the right to stop me!"--but I know what I mean by it. And what I mean by it has been shaped by my understanding of what our forefathers meant by it. (I would note that by "forefathers" I don't just mean the signers of the Declaration of Independence and the framers of the Constitution. I mean the everyday, ordinary sort of people. You know, the ones who actually made the Constitution law by their approval of it, the ones whose interpretation of the Constitution make for its real original intent?)

So, first let us discuss "individual liberty" and what conservatives should mean by it. I take my understanding of individual liberty from our forefathers, who seemed to take it from Micah 4:1-5. To paraphrase it all into one sentence, it is when every man walks in the name of the Lord, and sits under his vine, and his own fig tree, and there is nothing to make any afraid, or at least as close to this as is possible this side of the Parousia. "Liberty," then, is the product of a proper order--defended not just by law, but by religious conviction and virtue--that allows men to tend to their own families and such without the need for interference to make them do good or keep them from doing evil. There is no need for interference because virtuous men freely choose to live their lives this way.

Then what should conservatives mean by "limited government," you ask? It should mean that first you take care of your family, and your neighbors, and your congregation, and your coworkers, and your employees, and the other guys in the 4-H, and the other members of your fraternal order, and the guys on your softball team, and any of your countless other immediate and personal connections. You do it because you have real relationships with these people, and such relationships mean that you have duties to each other. If that isn't enough, then you turn to your town, or city, or municipality, or whatnot to pitched in. And if that still isn't enough, then you turn to your state. If that fails, then and only then do you turn to the federal government. And when it is necessary to turn to these more remote levels of government, you remember that the limitations on their power were set in place so they couldn't butt in where they weren't needed and make a mess of things. And, as such, you respect these limitations and, if modifying them is necessary, you do so prudently and through the proper legal process.

Now, the problem is that, with a few exceptions, few people use these terms this way anymore. And when we conservatives use them we are often misunderstood. So I would suggest perhaps modifying the terms a little. For example, I try never to speak simply of "liberty," but rather to speak of "ordered liberty," as did men such as Edmund Burke, George Washington and Russell Kirk, to name just a few. This calls immediately to mind the fact that true liberty cannot exist without the proper ordering of the soul and of society. And I try never to speak about "limited government" without discussing the principle of subsidiarity and federalism, which is the framework for the implementation of subsidiarity in the American political tradition.

Now, the election of 2008 makes it likely that conservatives are going to have very little influence in the corridors of power. So be it. Remember that this loss happened, at least in part, because the so-called "conservative" major party was far more right- to center-liberal than truly conservative. Make sure you let them know that. Speak out for virtue, for the priority of the local, the preeminence of the family and for all those things that true conservatives hold dear. And, more importantly, live these things in your life. If the culture is poison, then be the antidote. The counter-revolution doesn't start in the voting booth, or at the party committee meeting, or on the soapbox. It starts in our communities, in our homes, and in our hearts.

Whether it is manful to weep?

Objection 1: It seems that it is not manful to weep. For to be manful is to possess qualities befitting a man. And of the qualities most befitting a man (vir) are the virtues (virtutes). But the virtues are good habits which participates in reason, as the Angelic Doctor shows (Summa Theologiae, I-II. q. 55, a. 4c). But when one is in the midst of strong weeping the use of reason is hindered, and thus too are the virtues hindered. Thus weeping is not manful.

Objection 2: As was stated above, that which is manful is that which is virtuous for a man. But in his Confessions (IX.xii), St. Augustine tells how he fought back tears at the death of his mother St. Monica. Now, Saints are those who possess "heroic virtue." Thus it is not manful to weep.

Sed contra: The Evangelist John states: "And Jesus wept" (John xi.35). But our Lord is without vice or sin. Thus it cannot necessarily be contrary to virtue and right reason to weep, and thus it cannot be unmanful.

Respondeo dicendum: As has been stated, that which is manful is that which befits a man, and that which most befits a man is virtue. Thus the question is whether weeping is contrary to virtue. And to this we must answer as follows: to weep follows from sorrow or pain. Now, sorrow or pain are passions and passions are specified by their objects. Thus it would follow that whether or not particular pain or sorrow is virtuous is dependent upon whether or not the object over which one feels pain or sorrow is one for which it would be proper to feel pain or sorrow according to right reason. Now, insofar as one feels pain and sorrow properly and in accord with right reason, it would not be vicious to weep on account of said pain or sorrow. And thus it would not be unmanful to weep insofar as one feels pain or sorrow in accord with right reason. For example, it would not be unmanful to weep on account of one's sins.

Reply to Objection 1: The Angelic Doctor states that "it is not contrary to virtue, if the act of reason be sometimes interrupted for something that is done in accordance with reason, else it would be against virtue for a person to set himself to sleep" (Summa Theologiae, I-II. q. 153, a. 2 ad 2). Thus, insofar as the pain or sorrow one feels is in accord with right reason, and insofar as one weeps in accord with right reason, i.e. one does not allow weeping to hinder one from performing acts of virtue and duty that one is required to perform, then weeping is not contrary to right reason even if it interrupts reason.

Reply to Objection 2: St. Augustine, in the same place, informs us that he did not weep openly and in public because "in most cases it is customary to use such mourning to imply sorrow for the miserable state of those who die, or even their complete extinction. But my mother's dying meant neither that her state was miserable nor that she was suffering extinction" (Confessions IX.xii). However he later wept for his mother while bathing in private. Thus the Saint refrained from weeping for the death of his mother not because it was vicious per se, but because to do so publicly would have caused scandal by leading others to believe that St. Monica was rendered miserable or extinct by her death.

Tolerance is not a virtue

Virtue is a good habit which participates in reason, which is the principle of good actions, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us. This is the definition of virtue that one can derive from St. Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologiae I-II.55.4c. It is derived from St. Augustine's definition of virtue, found in De Libero Arbitrio ii, 19. (Properly speaking, of course, this is the definition of infused virtues, of which God is the efficient cause, but if we remove the phrase, "which God works in us, without us," then it is true of all virtues, both infused and acquired.¹)

The habit of tolerance, as it seems to be defined today, is the habit of taking a permissive attitude towards evil. By a permissive attitude is meant a disposition which allows that which one is disposed towards to happen without interference or protest. As to what this permissive attitude is directed towards, it cannot be the good. This is because the good is that which is desired and sought out, not what is simply allowed. That this permissive attitude is directed towards evil follows necessarily.²

This should be sufficient to show that tolerance is not a virtue. A virtue is the principle of good actions. But tolerance is the principle of not acting against some evil. But to not act against evil that one has a duty to act against is to do evil. Thus tolerance can be the principle of doing evil and so cannot be a virtue.³

Notes:

1. Technically speaking, God is the efficient cause of all virtues on the metaphysical level, since habits are beings, if only per accidens. But on the physical level we are the cause of acquired virtues, while God is the cause of infused virtues. See St. Thomas' reply to objection 6 in the above mentioned article.

2. Some would argue that since we are primarily talking about a permissive attitude towards actions there is the option of neutral in addition to good and evil. I disagree. Actions, like habits, are beings, if only per accidens. An action either posses the fullness of being that an action should posses, or it does not posses said fullness of being because of some defect in form (the object of the action, what John Paul II calls the proximate end in Veritatis Splendor), accidents (the circumstances of the action) or cause (the intention of the agent, what St. Thomas calls the end and what John Paul II calls the remote end in in Veritatis Splendor). Thus, an action is either good or bad. It seems to me that acts which many call neutral are ones which either posses only a small degree of being in their fullness or have only a slight defect.

3. It is true that individual acts of toleration may not be evil. It would not be evil to tolerate the evil of the law allowing a criminal to avoid punishment, since an individual citizen does not have the authority to act in the place of the state in such a situation unless the state has deputized him to do so. In general, an act of toleration is a good thing when you do not have the authority to stop the evil or when acting or openly protesting against the evil would result in greater evil and disorder than refraining from acting or openly protesting the evil would. But the virtues that would govern these individual acts of toleration would be justice--which would govern whether or not you have the authority to act--and prudence--which would govern whether or not acting would lead to a greater evil than not acting.