The logic of modernity

At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. ~Planned Parenthood v Casey

I believe that I've written explicitly enough that the killing of George Tiller was murder, and that it was both evil and foolish for Roeder to do so. That being said, let us reason together.

The quote above is, as stated, from the decision in the Supreme Court case Planned Parenthood v Casey. That means, at least insofar as the present day workings of the legal system of these United States goes, that the quoted position is to be taken as a basic principle contained in and protected by the Constitution of the United States. Now assume the following: Roeder defines human life in such a way that abortionists are not included under it, or at least under the category of human life whereby one is protected by a right to not be killed. Or assume Roeder defines the universe in such a way that it is a moral imperative for abortionists to be killed because of what they do. Or assume both, or any similar type of position, or every similar type of position.

Under such an assumption, how can Roeder be prosecuted for murder? He has a basic Constitutional right to define these things for himself, and to do so without any compulsion from the State. That compulsion obviously includes using laws against his position to punish him. This is the same logic that says abortion must be legal, else we would we using "compulsion" to define things like life for people and thus denying them their liberty. If Roeder holds any position similar to the ones given above, then he should be immune from prosecution under the Constitution of the United States as authoritatively interpreted by the United States' Supreme Court.

In other words, the logic of modernity and basic consistency demand that Roeder be free from prosecution by the State. If they were truly consistent, then pro-aborts would be decrying Tiller's murder, but at the same time they would be decrying any attempt to prosecute Roeder. They would admit that they do not like the murder of abortionists. But the answer to that is simple: if you don't like abortionists being murdered, then don't murder one. They would reach across the aisle, extending hands of peace and cooperation, so that both pro-lifers and pro-aborts could work together to make the murder of abortionists safe, legal and rare.

This is what logic would demand. Moderns love to claim the mantle of logic and reason. Let us see if any actually follow their first principles were logic leads.

Contraception, abortion, euthanasia and the slippery slope

(N.B. This is a slightly modified form of an argument I first wrote in one of Mark Shea's comment boxes. The original is available here.)

There are a number of people who have pointed out that the acceptance of contraception will lead to the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia. Think, for example, of the prophetic words of Pope Paul VI in Humanae vitae. Yet there are many who argue that such a stance is an example of the fallacious slippery slope form of argument.

The argument that the acceptance of contraception logically leads to the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia is not a slippery slope. It entails necessary conclusions drawn from what the acts of contraception, abortion and euthanasia are, and from the principles that must be accepted to view these acts as morally acceptable.

Sex causes babies. This is what sex does. To say that there is a right to contraception entails holding that one has a right to the cause of babies - sex - without the result that naturally follows - the babies themselves.

Principle 1: a right to sex without babies.

There is, however, a problem: no form of contraception is 100% reliable. Barrier methods fail, pills fail &c. But we already necessarily hold that there is a right to sex without babies. Thus there must be an all purpose backup that will eliminate babies in the cases were contraception fails. This is abortion. This is how abortion was historically argued for by a number of people, i.e. as a necessary backup to contraception.

Moreover, it is still how abortion is argued for today. Please see this HuffPo article that Mark Shea links to here: "Others find that their dignity depends on being able to end the pregnancy." Human dignity depends on Principle 1, on the right to sex without babies. Thus human dignity depends on abortion.

There is, however, a problem. From the moment of conception there is a genetically unique, self-contained, self-directed, genetically human life. This is a fact that science - today's great god-king of all that is knowable - confirms. There is no logical way to say that this life is anything other than a human being. But Principle 1 necessarily demands that this innocent human being can be killed if it is not desired. Thus it must follow that human life only has worth dependent on circumstances. It has no inherent worth in itself.

Principle 2: Human life has no inherent worth.

Now, the chronically sick and the elderly can be difficult to care for. Caring for them can be just as difficult, if not more difficult, than raising children. But we have already posited a right to sex without children. How can we have a right to be free of the latter "burden," but not the former? We cannot, and Principle 2 gives us the way out.

The chronically sick and the elderly live lives that are of a lesser quality than others do. They live with pain. They suffer a loss of qualities such as speed, strength, agility, beauty &c. They are a "burden" on those who have to take care of them and are usually without a means giving much of anything back as compensation for being such a "burden."

We would certainly appraise the value of anything else that had so many detriments with so few benefits as being of little worth. And since Principle 2 holds that human life has no inherent worth, we can appraise the value of a human life the same way we would appraise the value of anything else. Thus we can appraise the life of the chronically ill and the elderly as being worthless and eliminate them is we so choose.

Contraception necessarily requires abortion because the principle behind the acceptance of contraception is that we have a right to sex without babies, and the only way to fully guaranty sex without babies is to have abortion as a backup for the failure of ontraception. The acceptance of abortion necessarily requires that some innocent human life is worth less than others and can thus be taken if it is undesirable. It thus becomes a necessary principle that human life has no inherent worth. And if human life has no inherent worth, then there is no reason why the life of the chronically ill and elderly cannot be appraised as having little worth and eliminated so as to relieve the burden that would otherwise be imposed on those who would have to care for them.

In proof form:

If you accept a right to contraception, then you accept Principle 1.

If you accept Principle 1, then you accept that abortion is a right.

Therefore, if you accept a right to contraception, then you accept that abortion is a right.

That is a valid hypothetical syllogism.

If you accept that abortion is a right, then you accept Principle 2.

If you accept Principle 2, then you accept euthanasia.

Therefore, if you accept that abortion is a right, then you accept euthanasia.

That is another valid hypothetical syllogism.

If you accept a right to contraception, then you accept that abortion is a right.

If you accept that abortion is a right, then you accept euthanasia.

Therefore, if you accept a right to contraception, then you accept euthanasia.

This is yet another valid hypothetical syllogism.

The conclusion is thus proved: If you accept contraception, logical adherence to principles demands that you accept abortion and euthanasia.

On the murder of George Tiller

I have seen a number of Catholics question whether the killing of the child-murderer George Tiller was actually an act of murder. In more than one place I have seen an analogy drawn between the act of the killer and the assassination of Hitler planned and attempted by Colonel Claus Philipp Maria Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg. The thinking seems to be that, since both Hitler and Tiller were mass murderers, if killing one can be justified, so can killing the other. The analogy not only fails, but it does dishonor to the memory of Colonel Stauffenberg by associating him with a murderer. I will take the time to spell out why and in what ways the analogy fails for the sake of honoring a true German patriot and hopefully shedding some light on some bad moral philosophy and theology.

First, the analogy fails because Stauffenberg did not attempt to assassinate Hitler simply qua mass murderer, but qua tyrant. And even this can be argued as potentially suspect, since tradition has generally held that a tyrant by usurpation can be justly killed but a tyrant by oppression must be deposed by legal, not extra-legal, means. Indeed, the Syllabus of Pius IX condemned the proposition that, "It is lawful to refuse obedience to legitimate princes, and even to rebel" (prop. 63). See the article from the 1912 Catholic Encyclopedia for more information.

Now, it can be argued that a tyrant by oppression can become a tyrant by usurpation when they extend their power in a manner that is contrary to the law and constitution of their nation. As far as I can see, such an argument appears sound. Thus Hitler would have been a tyrant by usurpation after illegally taking the presidential power for himself following the death of President Paul von Hindenburg, if for no other reason - and I'm sure that at least a few more, if not many, could be found. But even given this, the analogy fails.

The second reason the analogy fails as follows: even if one is acting against a tyrant, one is only justified in acting if doing so will do less harm to the tyrant's subjects than the tyrant's continued rule (Summa Theologia (hereafter ST), II-II, q. 42 ad 3). Even if Tiller where somehow analogous with a tyrant qua tyrant, this does not hold. The potential lives saved - and they are only potential, since we neither have evidence that anyone who was signed up for an abortion with him would have gone through with it, nor that he would not have eventually been stopped by legal means due to performing abortions after it was legal to do so, nor that the grace of God would not have moved him to repentance, nor that some other doctor will not now willingly step in and take his place due to the fact that the pro-abortion crowd can now treat him as their own twisted version of a martyr - these potential lives saved do not seem to outweigh the potential lives lost due to the marginalization of the pro-life message that will be attempted following the act, a marginalization that will further set back the legal battle against abortion.

But even if the lives saved do potentially outweigh the lives lost, the analogy still fails for a third reason. Tiller was not a tyrant. He did not have any special authority over the abortion laws of his state or of the union. Indeed, he willingly violated those laws that did exist. He was an evil man, but no private individual has the right to take the life of an evil man of his own volition. This authority rests with those people who have responsibility for maintaining the common welfare of society, and here only through those means as set out by the law (ST II-II, q. 62, a. 3c).

Finally, some have offered a hypothetical situation: suppose we find out that the man who killed Tiller was acting in the defense of a child or grandchild who was scheduled to be aborted by Tiller later that week? Even if this hypothetical is true, the act would still be murder for at least two reasons.

First, because self-defense must be proportionate to the threat (ST II-II, q. 62, a. 7c). Since the hypothetical child we are speaking of was not immediately under Tiller's knife, the violence used was not proportional to the immediate threat to the hypothetical child's life. Tiller's attacker could have first attempted to convince the mother of the hypothetical child not to go through with the abortion. Failing that, he could have restrained her until she gave birth. Such an act would have been illegal, but the attacker apparently had no qualms in breaking the law, and such an act would have been proportional to the threat at the time.

Second, even if the physical force used would have been proportional to the threat, a private individual still cannot intend to kill an attacker, only to repulse the attack with the force necessary for doing so (ibidem). To intend otherwise would be to violate the aforementioned rule forbidding private individuals from taking the life of an evildoer of their own volition.

There is no analogy between Tiller's killer and Colonel Stauffenberg. The tradition of Catholic moral philosophy and theology clearly appear to condemn the killing of Tiller as an evil act of murder. We may not do evil that good may come of it. And of those who say we can, I offer only the words of St. Paul: damnatio iusta est, "their damnation is just" (Romans iii.viii).

As for the fall-out of this act, my opinions have already been written. They once again boil down to this: "Unfurl the black banner. Quarter neither asked for nor given. No Surrender, no retreat."

I know that, given the ludicrous, hysterical and void of documentation Homeland Security Report we found out about not two months ago, I may be suspect as a "domestic terrorist" simply because I called a spade a space and said that Tiller was a murderer and evil, even though I did it while condemning his own murder. But I already had a Ron Paul bumper sticker on my car, so I was suspect long before writing this. I plan to become even more suspect by eventually adding a Gadsden flag bumper sticker, a Bonnie Blue flag bumper sticker, a 1st National flag bumper sticker, and maybe even a Jolly Roger bumper sticker. So color me not all that frightened.

Indeed, given that same report, and the fact that the last such murder or attempted murder was over ten years ago, I am not yet certain that this whole thing is not simply a false flag. But I take heart in the fact that today is the memorial of St. Justin Martyr. To quote the saint: "For as for us, we reckon that no evil can be done us, unless we be convicted as evil-doers or be proved to be wicked men; and you, you can kill, but not hurt us" (First Apology, Chapter 2). "You can kill, but not hurt us." Words to remember when things seem darkest.

NB: This is a reductio ad absurdum, not serious moral advice.

I urge all married men to give into their urges to seduce that co-ed who babysits their children or that young secretary at work. It's no big deal. If your wife catches you and feels betrayed, just say, "Honey, it couldn't have been evil. After all, I've done the same thing with you and you thought that was just fine."

After all, the same hip-thrusting action is going on in both activities. It's as absurd to call one "adultery" as it is to call the waterboarding of prisoners "torture." After all, we perform the same actions on our own troops in training, right? So it can't be evil.

The foolishness of values subjectivity

"At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life" (Planned Parenthood v. Casey).

If all values are purely subjective, then your life is only worth what I hold it to be worth. And if I hold it to be worth less than anything else, and I further believe that it is worth sacrificing your life to achieve something I value more, then you have no right to stop me. To do so would be to impose your meaning of human life on me, and my right to define human life for myself is at the heart of liberty. What are you, a fascist?

"Then mankind would have become as the Great Old Ones; free and wild and beyond good and evil, with laws and morals thrown aside and all men shouting and killing and reveling in joy. Then the liberated Old Ones would teach them new ways to shout and kill and revel and enjoy themselves, and all the earth would flame with a holocaust of ecstasy and freedom" (H.P. Lovecraft, "The Call of Cthulhu").

Fhtagn, baby. The stars will soon be right. They must be. After all, we're almost there already.

Of course the best part of all thus bull plop is that it is self-refuting. If liberty means that I get to define life, the universe and everything, then that means I have every right to define them in such a way as to allow me to forcibly impose my definitions on others. Which in turn violates the right people have to define life, the universe and everything.

Do we actually pay Supreme Court justices? Because this is first year undergrad, intro to philosophy, "here's your F-" crap.

A bit on marriage basics

What is essential to marriage? It is essential to marriage that the couple, by being the kind of couple it is, is ordered towards having children. That is the basic essence of marriage.

A couple that consists of a man and a woman, by being the kind of couple that it is, is ordered towards having children. This is true even is this particular couple, consisting of this man and this woman, is not capable of having children due to age or infertility. It is even true if this man and this woman use contraception to prevent themselves from having children. The universal, i.e. being this type of couple, is essential. The particular, i.e. being this particular couple, is accidental.

A couple that consists of two men or two women is not ordered towards having children. This is true by virtue of being the kind of couples they are. Neither two men nor two women are capable of making a baby. This is not due to being this particular couple, but to being this type of couple. It is not accidental, it is essential. As such, neither two men nor two women are capable of marriage.

I hope that clears it up for everyone who tries to argue for same sex "marriage" by arguing that we do not make heterosexual couples prove they will not use contraception before the government considers them married. Such arguments are fallacious. They are examples of the fallacy of the accident.

Abortion and government

There are those who feel that it is acceptable to vote for a pro-abortion politician if their other positions appear to benefit the common good and help reduce the number of abortions. The problem with this position is that reducing the number of abortions, as important as this is, is not enough. If abortion could be completely eliminated in fact but was still legal, then the task is not finished. This is because the legality of abortion is itself an attack on the very foundations of the rule of law and the common good.

As Blessed Pope John XXIII taught in Mater et Magistra, "individual human beings are the foundation, the cause and the end of every social institution" (219). The legality of abortion is a direct assault on the foundation and purpose of the political community itself. The rule of law and the common good are meaningless concepts if innocent human beings are allowed to be legally murdered.

This teaching is reaffirmed and made even more explicit in Servant of God Pope John Paul II’s encyclical Evangelium Vitae: "Disregard for the right to life, precisely because it leads to the killing of the person whom society exists to serve, is what most directly conflicts with the possibility of achieving the common good" (72). One cannot truly work towards the common good by ignoring the legality of abortion. The legality of abortion necessarily undermines the common good.

A candidate who runs on a pro-abortion platform essentially states that he will not work towards the purpose of government, i.e. the common good. He renders his administration incapable of benefiting the common good in any way except accidentally. This is because the very nature his administration's position attacks the common good by enabling the legal attack on the lives of the unborn.

Any attempt to put forward a pro-abortion politician as an acceptable candidate fails. A candidate who promises to attack the very foundation and purpose of government, the good of life on which all the rest of the common good depends, can never be acceptable.

What intentions can and cannot do, part I

Suppose that law makers passed a law that demanded all $100 bills be printed in blue ink. But further suppose that those law makers, in passing this law, really intended that all $100 bills be printed in red ink. Would it be a false interpretation of the law to rule that printing $100 bills in blue ink was in keeping with the law, while printing $100 bills in red ink was a violation of the law? Do the intentions of the law makes force "blue" to mean red?

Faith is not and cannot be private

Who has not heard a Catholic politician say something along these lines: "I am a Catholic, but I cannot let my faith unduly influence my actions as a public official because my faith is a private matter."

This is a pernicious falsehood. It is the duty of all Catholics to publicly live their faith and it is especially the duty of the laity to live their faith in the public sphere.

This is first and foremost made clear in Sacred Scripture. Our Lord makes this explicit to His followers: "You are the light of the world. A city seated on a mountain cannot be hid. Neither do men light a candle and put it under a bushel, but upon a candlestick, that it may shine to all that are in the house. So let your light shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father who is in heaven" (Matthew 5: 14-6; Cf. Mark 4: 21; Luke 11: 33-6). Similarly, St. James tell us in his epistle that "faith without works is dead" (James 2: 20, 26).

One can find this clear teaching reiterated by the Church. I do not know what the so-called "spirit" of Vatican II says about it, but the texts of Vatican II explicitly state that it is the vocation of the laity to carry their faith into the world through their actions:

Each individual layman must stand before the world as a witness to the resurrection and life of the Lord Jesus and a symbol of the living God. All the laity as a community and each one according to his ability must nourish the world with spiritual fruits. They must diffuse in the world that spirit which animates the poor, the meek, the peace makers-whom the Lord in the Gospel proclaimed as blessed. In a word, "Christians must be to the world what the soul is to the body" (Lumen gentium, 38).

Thus it seems clear that no Catholic can be faithful to the teachings of the Church while holding that his faith is merely a private matter. The Church explicitly teaches otherwise. Faith cannot be something we simply hold privately. Rather, it should be the source of our actions, giving birth to hope and charity, and motivating us to conform all the things and actions in our lives, whether they be public or private, to Christ.

Just in case

Just in case its removed for being "offensive," I thought I would share my comment (EDIT: posted on the Washington Post's site) on this opinion piece :

"All Beliefs Welcome, Unless They are Forced on Others"

I hope the good Professor Doninger will join my continuing campaign to overturn any laws that make it illegal for me to kill those who annoy me. After all, what right does anyone have to force a belief about the immorality of "murder" on me? And besides, "Though shalt not kill," is one of those "Ten Commandments." Thus, not allowing me to kill those who annoy me is equivalent to imposing religion upon me.

Such laws also violate my constitutional rights. The majority opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States of America states, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, that I have, "the right to define [my] own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." I do not believe that those who annoy me are human. Nor do they, it follows, possess human life. To keep me from killing them is to impose upon me a view of "the mystery of human life" that is contrary to my own, which is a grievous violation of my constitutional liberties.

I hope all who read this article are convinced by the sound argument presented and join me in my campaign for my moral and Constitutional right to kill all those who annoy me.

Have I "reducio"-ed enough to make the "absurdum" obvious?

On rights

Take a man. Remove him from all historic and social context. Take him as a lone, autonomous individual. What rights does he have?

A liberal--either a left-liberal or one of those right-liberals we erroneously call "conservatives"--would probably be able to produce a short, or even a long, list. Certainly the left-liberal list and the right-liberal list would differ somewhat in content and emphasis, but either kind of liberal would be able to produce a list. Both lists would be wrong.

The correct answer is "none." A man possesses no rights when he is removed from all historic and social context. If such a thing as a lone, autonomous individual existed, he would exist without any rights whatsoever.

It is a good thing, then, that there is no such thing as a lone, autonomous individual. Man, as a bodily and incarnate being, always exists within a historic and social context. And it is only within this historic and social context that the concept of "rights" has any meaning at all.

A "right" is not a quality. Rights exist as complements to duties. Both only exist as relations within the context of relationships. A relation is a reference to another. To say one has a right means that one is owed something by another. One cannot speak of this right without referencing, at least implicitly, said other. To say one has a duty means that one owes something to another. One cannot speak of this duty without referencing, at least implicitly, said other.

This, then, is why it is absurd to speak of rights as existing when removed from historic and social context. A man exists within a particular time and place. This particular time and place governs the context of a man's relationships. And it is only within said relationships that the idea of rights has any actual content.

Q&A I

Q: Why do you oppose abortion?

A: I can think of neither a legal nor a moral reason to allow the direct and intentional taking of an innocent human life.

Q: Do you oppose abortion even in cases of rape?

A: Yes. I oppose the direct and intentional taking of an innocent human life.

Q: Do you oppose abortion even in cases of incest?

A: Yes. I oppose the direct and intentional taking of an innocent human life.

Q: Do you oppose abortion even in cases where the life of the mother is or may be in danger?

A: Yes. I oppose the direct and intentional taking of an innocent human life.

Q: What would you say to those who argue that a fetus is not innocent?

A: Guilt and culpability require freedom of choice. No child has any choice whether or not to be conceived. Thus it is fallacious to impute any kind of moral culpability to an unborn child.

Q: What would you say to those who argue that the life of a fetus is not a human life?

A: What else would one call a unique and individual living being that possesses a complete human genetic code? Can anyone give me a name that is more accurate rather than an attempt at obfuscation?

Q: What would you say to those who argue that a fetus is not a unique and individual living being that possesses a complete human genetic code, and thus that a fetus is not a human life?

A: Perhaps they should purchase a simple introduction to embryology. (See here and here for some pertinent quotes from assorted text books.)

Obtectively evil acts and gravity

I want to briefly discuss something I've touched on before. To say an act is objectively evil is to say that an act is evil by its very nature. An objectively evil act cannot be changed to a good act by our intentions or the circumstances surrounding its being committed.

But to say an act is objectively evil is not to say anything about the seriousness or gravity of the act. An act can be objectively evil without being grave, or grave without being objectively evil. Allow me to demonstrate.

Stealing is objectively evil. It is never permissible to take property that does not belong to you and that you have no right to. It would be an objectively evil act to steal ten dollars a dollar from the petty cash at your place of employment. (EDIT: changed the example a little to more clearly illustrate the point.) Yet it might not be gravely evil to do so. This is because stealing this ten dollars dollar, especially if you work for a multi-million dollar, multi-national corporation, does not do very much harm to the business at all. It is the kind of thing that might even be overlooked or ignored as a minor bookkeeping error. So while you have done something objectively evil, you have not done something that is necessarily gravely evil. Some older catechisms and moral manuals might even have considered this example to be only a venial sin, since its gravity is greatly diminished. (I wish my few old moral theology manuals weren't packed away in a storage box somewhere in the house, so I could check on this to be sure.)

Going to war is not objectively evil. If the condition of just war theory are met, the war is an act of justice and is not evil to enter into. But if a country enters into an unjust war, this would be gravely evil. This is because wars, even small ones, cause great suffering, death and destruction. That is of course why the rulers of a nation must be especially careful in examining whether or not the criteria for a just war have been met before committing themselves to such a course of action.

I think the confusion that sometimes arises over the distinction between whether or not an act is objectively evil and whether or not an act is gravely evil arises because of the issue of abortion. Abortion is both objectively evil--it is an act that can never legitimately be done--and gravely evil--because it is the killing of an innocent human being. People understand both of these facts, but since they are so used to referring to abortion as objectively evil, they begin to associate the grave matter of a sin with the formal category of objectively evil actions.

It is important to remember the distinction between the formal nature of the act and the matter of the act. Abortion is an act that is both formally evil and materially grave, but acts can also be neither formally evil nor materially grave, formally evil but not materially grave, and not formally evil but materially grave. Drawing proper distinctions in this fashion does nothing to lesson the evils of abortion, but it does allow us to properly judge other actions based upon both formal and material considerations.

Two points on moral reasoning

1. To say that "act A is not objectively evil" is not equivalent to saying that "act A is good." An act can fail to be objectively evil and still be evil.

It's not objectively evil to go have a few beers with your buddies after work. That doesn't mean that there is no moral difference between going home to eat dinner with your family and going out for said beers. It is illegitimate to say that one of those choices cannot be said to be a morally bad, i.e. evil, choice.

2. The main question when reasoning about the morality of an action is not, "how will the affect the world?" Rather, it is, "how will this affect my soul and character?" How an act will affect the world is not unimportant, but it is secondary.

You could say that, but you'd be wrong

As I've said elsewhere, justice involves treating similar things similarly and different things differently. I believe that I've also mentioned the fact that certain particulars--especially certain relations--are not simply circumstantial to acts, but play a part in defining the object of an action. And I am quite certain that I have spelled what I believe to be the connection between justice, relationships, rights and duties. The point being, of course, that the particulars of a situation can play a large part in whether or not an action is just or not, and even whether an act is objectively evil or not.

It is illegitimate to abstract actions away from important particular details so as to attempt to judge an action moral or immoral. One cannot abstract the sexual intercourse between a man and a woman out to nothing more than the physical action in an attempt to argue that fornication is moral since it is no different than the conjugal love between a husband and wife. It is illegitimate to abstract out the act of shooting a gun at another man to simply pointing and pulling the trigger to argue that there is no difference between murder and legitimate self-defense. In both these situation the particular relationship between the agent and the subject is fundamental to the object of the action and the attempt to ignore these particulars by illegitimate abstraction is pure sophistry.

In the same way, it is illegitimate to argue that it is hypocritical to be opposed to the secession of Kosovo from Serbia but to be neutral-leaning-towards-favorable for South Ossatia to secede from Georgia and join the Russian federation. The particular historic and existential details are enormously different in the two cases, and this effects what is the just decision in each. To whit:

Kosovo is an historic part of Serbia. There is no historic basis whatsoever for an independent state of Kosovo. An independent Kosovo does nothing but create a state run by Islamic mafioso in the middle of the one of Christendom's first bulwarks against assault by Jihad.

South Ossetia is not an historic part of Georgia. Indeed, its history supports its separation from Georgia and its close allegiance with Russia. The reason that South Ossetia is a part of Georgia boils down to "because Stalin said so."

These completely different historical relationships make a difference in judging the justice of the two situations. You could say it's hypocrisy to have different views on the independence of Kosovo and South Ossetia, but you'd be wrong.

"You can't legislate morality!"

What, then, if anything, can one legislate, pray tell?

Look, lets be clear here. The law both prescribes and proscribes human action. All human action is governed by morality. Thus, any legislature, by definition, is the legislation of morality in some way or another. The real question is whether or not it is the legislation of correct morality.

So let us hear no more of this "You can't legislate morality!" twaddle.

3rd (Tentative) Definition of Torture

Torture is any act that causes pain to another person where the agent has power over the subject and no relationship exists between the agent and the subject that would offer the subject a guaranty that the agent will not act towards harming the subject per se.

By "has power over" I mean that the subject is unable or unlikely to be able to prevent the agent from acting upon the subject.

By "harming... per se" I mean acting in such a way that the effect of the action is nothing other than harm in and of itself.

Resisting evil

"But I say to you not to resist evil: but if one strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him also the other" (Matthew V, 39).

Is the preceding quote from the Sermon on the Mount a universal moral precept? It would seem not. Commenting on John XVIII, 22-3--"And when he had said these things, one of the servants standing by, gave Jesus a blow, saying: Answerest thou the high priest so? Jesus answered him: If I have spoken evil, give testimony of the evil; but if well, why strikest thou me?"--St. Thomas Aquinas says the following:

So Sacred Scripture is to be understood according to all that Christ and the saints have kept. Christ did not offer His other cheek, nor Paul either (Acts XVI, 22ff). Thus it is not to be understood that Christ has commanded everyone to literally offer the physical other cheek to he that strikes someone; but this ought to be understood as preparation of the soul, that if it will be necessary, one ought therefore to be disposed to not be disturbed in soul facing a beating, but let one be prepared for the like and to put up with more besides. And this the Lord kept, whereby He offered his body at the fit time. So therefore this action of the Lord is useful for our instruction.¹

The passage in Acts that St. Thomas references is when Paul and Silas were unjustly beaten and imprisoned in Philippi. When they were to be released the next day, Paul refused until the magistrates came and released them personally, for Paul and Silas were Roman citizens who had been beaten and imprisoned unlawfully. The Douay-Rheims commentary on Matthew V, 39 also references Acts XXIII, where Paul, upon hearing that some Jews were planing to kill him, sends the witness who brought him this information to the tribune, who in turn called for soldiers to protect Paul from the attack.

Thus, the meaning of the passage in Matthew cannot be that we can never resist evil, and instead always suffer in silence. Christ Himself rebukes injustice rather than offer His other cheek for striking. Paul utilized his full legal rights, as a citizen of Rome, to protect himself from evil and to rebuke those who unjustly did evil to him. Rather, the verses encourage the Christian to bear evils he cannot avoid or defend against with patience and love, praying for the good of those who harm them rather than hating them and wishing evil upon them. But if a Christian can morally defend himself and others against evil, he may do so. Nothing about defending against evil requires hatred or bitterness instead of love. Love and resistance to evil are not mutually exclusive.

¹ Super Evangelium S. Ioannis, cap. 18, l. 4: "Sic sacra Scriptura intelligenda est secundum quod Christus et alii sancti servaverunt. Christus autem non praebuit isti aliam maxillam: nec Paulus, Act. XVI, 22 ss. Unde non est intelligendum quod Christus mandasset quod praeberent maxillam aliam corporalem ad litteram ei qui percutit unam; sed hoc debet intelligi quantum ad praeparationem animi, quod si necesse fuerit, ita debet esse dispositus ut non turbetur animo contra percutientem, sed paratus sit simile et etiam amplius sustinere. Et hoc dominus servavit, qui corpus suum praebuit occisioni. Sic ergo excusatio domini utilis fuit ad nostram instructionem."

Rights, duties, relationships and justice

I hate talk of "rights" because it is so often void of content. Rights do not exist except as the result of duties, both of which exits only within the context of relationships, which are in turn governed by justice. If you do not speak about "rights" in connection with these other three things, then you are not speaking about anything at all.

A right is, by definition, something which a person is due from some other person, people or entity. If you are due something from someone, then they--again, by definition--have a duty to render to you that which you are due. So rights do not exist except where duties exist and vice versa. One cannot exist without the other.

And neither can exist except within a relationship, since their very existence demands that a relationship exists. A relationship is, at its simplest, a reference to another. If I have a duty, it references the one I have the duty to by definition. The same is true with a right. The nature of the relationship that exists depends upon how the relationship came into existence and who the relationship is between. The relationship's nature governs what rights and duties are present within it.

Justice is the virtue of rendering to each what they are due. Someone is due something because he has a right to it and another has a duty to provide it for him. These rights and duties exist within the relationship and depend upon its nature. Thus justice rules what rights and duties exist within what relationships.

As such, rights are not the starting point in a discussion of ethics and politics. The starting point is what type of relationship exists and what justice says about it. For it is only from these that rights and duties can be derived.

Why being in favor of the capital punishment is not in opposition to being pro-life

It would seem that: No one who is in favor of capital punishment can be called pro-life, for "pro-life" means that one is in favor of protecting the life of all men, but being in favor of the use of capital punishment means that one is in favor of the death of some men. But the premises "no man should be killed" and "some men should be killed" are in contradictory opposition to each other, and thus if one is true, the other must be false; and conversely, if one is false, the other must be true. Therefore it is impossible to be both pro-life and in favor of the use of capital punishment.

Sed contra: The relationship between contradictory opposites follows from the principle of non-contradiction, for if both premises in a contradictory relationship were either true or false, then something would both be and not-be at the same time and in the same respect. But from this it must also be admitted that two premises are only in contradictory opposition if holding both would violate the principle of non-contradiction. And this is not necessarily the case with regards to those who are both pro-life and in favor the use of capital punishment. To wit, the premises are not held to both be true in the same respect.

For this to be properly understood, one must first consider the difference between the antecedent and the consequent will. As the Angelic Doctor explains when discussing how the divine will is always fulfilled against the objection that Scripture teaches that God wills all to be saved, yet Scripture and the holy Fathers also teach that not all will be saved (Summa theologiae, I, q. 19, a. 6 ad 1), their is a difference between the antecedent will and the consequent will. This difference is not in the will itself, but in respect to the things willed. That is, a thing may we good or evil in its primary sense and when considered absolutely, and yet after some additional qualities or attributes are consequently considered it may be that the contrary is true.

Absolutely speaking, antecedent to any circumstances, that a man live is good and that he be killed is evil. But consequently to certain qualities or attributes it may be good that some man be executed insofar as it is necessary for the preservation of the commonweal. Thus it may be said that it is possible to have a general willingness that all men live insofar as they are men, and yet will simply that particular men be executed, when this is a just and necessary punishment, and that capital punishment thus be kept legal for this purpose.

Thus it is obvious how one can be both pro-life and in favor of the use of capital punishment. To be pro-life is to have a general willingness that all men live and to will simply opposition to those act or species of acts that unjustly take human life. But to be in favor in favor of capital punishment is to will simply in favor of those acts that justly take human life. And insofar as this is done for the purpose of the protection of the commonweal it is consonant with the general willingness that all men live, since those guilty of capital crimes and justly executed are those who are a danger to the commonweal because they are, by their own choice, a danger to the lives of other citizens.