Something worth reading

Sandro Magister, "A Philosopher Reissues the Pope's Wager: To Live as if God Exists."

A brief article on Robert Spaemann's newest - at least as of October 31, 2008 - book, which does not yet seem to be available in English. Following the article are some excerpts.

My favorite bit:

With the loss of the idea of truth comes the loss of the idea of reality. Our speaking and thinking that which is, is structured in an inevitably temporal form. We cannot think of something as real without thinking of it in the present, meaning that it is real "now." Anything that has been only in the past, or will be only in the future, has never been and never will be. That which is now, at one time was in the future and will be in the past. The "futurum exactum," the future perfect, is inseparable from the present. Saying that a present event will no longer have been in the future means that in reality it does not exist even now. In this sense, everything real is eternal (emphasis added). There cannot be a moment in which it will no longer be true that someone has felt a suffering or joy that he is feeling now. And this past reality is absolutely independent of the fact that we remember it.

That might be the most profound thing I've read in awhile. I wish I read either German or Italian so I could pick up a copy of this book. Hopefully we'll eventually get an English translation. Or, barring that, I'll eventually work my way through my list of "Languages to Learn" to German or Italian.

God and substance

In reading an article for my thesis, I came across an argument that goes something like this: We must avoid the two erroneous extremes of pantheism, i.e. of seeing the whole of creation as an accident of God, and Aristotelianism, i.e. seeing created beings as substances that exist in themselves without the need of a reference to a creator. I think that the second half of this statement is false. I do not believe that what the article describes as Aristotelianism is a problem, nor that it entails holding that substances do not need reference to their creator.

God is not in any of the categories. God is the cause of all being and as such is the cause of all the categories. Thus the category of substance does not entail no relationship to God as creator.

The category of substance is traditionally held to be those things that exist in themselves, while the other nine categories are accidents, i.e. those things that exists through another. It is important to realize that the categories are categories of created beings, all of which have their existence through participation in the divine esse. Thus we could truthfully say that the category of substance contains those beings who possess their limited and participated existence in themselves, while the categories of accidents contain those things that only possess their limited and participated existence through some other created things.

One need not jettison the categories to preserve God's necessary creation and sustenance of all things. One need only realize that the categories themselves are categories of created beings. That, as far as I can tell, is how St. Thomas understood it.

A response given to an atheist of my acquaintance upon his demanding, point blank, that someone prove to him the existence of God.

This is analogously equivalent to a beginning student of algebra asking for someone to prove Gödel's incompleteness theorems to them. Without the necessary background the proofs aren't meaningful to the one being taught, so they must either believe the teacher based upon his own credentials and authority or else doubt the teacher because they did not understand him and thus weren't convinced.

Proof of the existence of God is the end of metaphysics. It takes as given all previous metaphysical principles, as well as the principles of the philosophy of nature that metaphysics takes as its foundations. A thorough account would take at least a book. A complete understanding could take a lifetime. That might not be very satisfying. Reality can be a harsh mistress.

I would also note that if by "proof" you mean "scientific proof," then you are asking for the impossible. I will note, however, that I am not saying this simply to say that the existence of God is not a question open to the empirical-mathematical method of modern science, which is interested only in the accidents of sensible quantity and measurable quality. I am saying this because the scientific method, as a method, is not capable of providing proof of anything in a strict sense.

The scientific method is an inductive and dialectic method which relies on continually observing things under particular circumstances, forming hypotheses based upon these observations and then testing the hypotheses against further observations. When one hypothesis is demonstrated to be false because reality does not follow the predicted outcome, the data is then reconsidered and a new hypothesis is formed and tested. When a hypothesis continually predicts reality correctly, it is then considered to be true.

This is not, however, equivalent to proving that the hypothesis is true. The hypothesis is probably true because particular circumstances have continually conformed to the hypothesis' predictions. But all it takes is a single, repeatable example in which the hypothesis fails to render said hypothesis false, at least in scope if not completely. Sometimes such observations take decades, or even centuries, to be realized because they require new tools to enhance our senses, allowing us to observe phenomena that we previously could not observe. For example, classical mechanics was long believed to be the whole of mechanics until we were able to observe phenomena on a much smaller scale, a scale in which classical mechanics breaks down and fails to make accurate predictions. Thus quantum mechanics was born.

Thus, the scientific method, being an inductive method, does not prove anything in the strict sense. Its results are probably true, but they are not definitely true. In the most accurate sense, the information about reality given by science would be called justified belief, which is traditionally the name given to propositions held due to induction (moving from the particular to the universal) and dialectics (the back and forth of hypotheses until one is arrived upon that cannot be disproved given the current circumstances).

However, in the interest of providing some help, I will offer the following link. It provides an audio lecture on some proofs for the existence of God by the philosopher Peter Kreeft, as well as links to some more of his writings on the question. I offer this link with two caveats:

1. These lectures and writings are simplifications for the purpose of speaking to a non-academic audience with little or no higher level training in philosophy. As such, it is possible that there are weaknesses in the arguments as presented that would not be present in more rigorous and academic presentations of them.

2. Simplifications such as these are sometimes targeted at audiences more inclined to agree with the arguments than not. As such, the tone of the presentation might be contrary to your sensibilities. This is simply what one must deal with when one is dealing with this kind of work. I feel the same way reading Dawkins or Dennett.

In librum B. Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio, c. IV, l. 9

Ex amore enim bonitatis suae processit quod bonitatem suam voluit diffundere et communicare aliis, secundum quod fuit possibile, scilicet per modum similitudinis et quod eius bonitas non tantum in ipso maneret, sed ad alia efflueret.

Indeed, from love of His goodness [God] proceeds insofar as He willed His goodness to be diffused and communicated to other things, according to all that is possible, i.e. by way of similitude and insofar as His goodness does not always remain in Himself, but flows forth into other things.

On artificial intelligence

I have been, for whatever reason, thinking a bit about artificial intelligence (AI). More precisely, I have been thinking about what is generally called "strong AI," i.e. artificial intelligence that matches or supersedes the human intellect, the kind you see in science fiction books and movies. My thinking has led me to believe that such a thing will never be.

First, the intellect is, for lack of a better term, a substantial or essential power. Its origin is in the substantial form, the essence, the nature of the being that possesses it. No machine possesses a substantial form. Rather, any machine qua machine possesses only an accidental form that is brought about through the organization of parts. These parts may be composed of a substance or substances, but the machine itself exists only insofar as said substance or substances are given certain shapes and arranged within certain relations. Since a machine possesses no substantial form, it cannot possess, qua machine, any power that has its origin in substantial form, and thus it cannot possess intellect.

Second, the intellect is a purely immaterial, spiritual power. It does not depend on matter for its operation, either the matter of the knower or the matter of the thing known. While in some intellectual beings, viz. man, matter may be required to provide the intellect with the forms it uses in its operation through the external and internal senses, this is accidental to the operation of the intellect qua intellect. Now, man does not have the power to create immaterial being. As such, man does not have the power to create intellect.

Third, is anyone familiar with the "Chinese room" argument of analytic philosopher John Searle? I have only a slight familiarity with it, but I believe it goes something like this: Take a man who understands no Chinese and put him in a room filled with data on the rules of the language, such as grammar, structure, likely replies to certain inquiries &c. Have a Chinese speaker try to communicate with the man through writing. Given enough time and enough data on the language, the man will be able to respond to the Chinese speaker in a way that is both grammatically correct and makes sense to the Chinese speaker. The Chinese speaker will believe he is having a meaningful conversation with the man in the room, but the man in the room will have no idea as to what the conversation is about. I find this argument interesting because it demonstrates the difference between manipulating symbols and understanding them.

St. Thomas, if I am not mistaken, held that words carry with them the form of things. The origin of words, whether written or spoken, is in the internal word, the knowledge of a thing possessed by the soul. The use of words is not just the manipulation of symbols, but is instead the transmission if intelligibility and form. The word directs one beyond itself to the thing in itself as it can be known by the soul.

Then there is a difference between instinct, stimulus/response, or rule based communication and true intellectual communication. The former has its origin in some amount of in-built rules that determine the response to certain stimuli. The latter goes beyond the perception of the stimuli and the interaction of the one who produced the stimuli and the one who responds to them, referencing a third being whose intelligibility and form the words carry and to whom the writer or speaker of the words directs the intellect of the one who receives them. The former happens only on the level of the sensible, while the latter transcends the sensible, using it to direct eh light of reason to investigate some communicated piece of reality.

Anyway, those are just some random thoughts I've had in the last few days. Any critiques, discussion or interesting references would be much appreciated.

On the use of the term "person"

The the term "person" and what it signifies, as it has been handed down to Western civilization through the Christological and Trinitarian deliberation of the early Ecumenical Councils, is primarily an ontological term that signifies a specific mode of being. A person is an individual substance of an intellectual nature. Or, to make more explicit what it means to be a person, we can say that a person: (1) possesses a substantial existence, not an accidental existence; (2) possesses a complete nature; (3) exists per se, possessing the fullness of its existence, its nature, and all its powers and acts; (4) separate from others, meaning that the primary sense of the term "person" refers to a specific individual rather than something universal, though we can use the term analogically to include all types of beings whose nature and mode of being render the individuals of said nature persons; (5) possessing an intellectual nature, i.e. possessing intellect and will.

Any use of the term person that does not fall under this specific definition is analogically related. For example, a legal person is treated as is it possessed a separate, substantial existence, possessing an intellect and will and being the full and sole possessor of all its powers and actions. A corporation, for example, does not possess any of the attributes of a person, but it is treated as such for the purpose of the law. This can be fine and necessary for a well running legal system (though I am myself opposed to corporate personhood). But if we loose site of the primary meaning of the term "person," the one from which any and all analogical uses stem, then we have lost sight of something very important to the proper understanding of human nature and the reality of the world.

Fairy-stories, the Good and the Beautiful

(N.B. This post is a slight expansion of a comment I left on this post over at The Sci Fi Catholic.)

The use of "beautiful = good" and "ugly = evil" is a standard fairy-story trope. This is why the spoiled prince gets turned into a hideous beast--since his soul is hideous--and only gets restored to his true form after he falls in love with a good woman who inspires him to be a better man. His outer appearance is made to match his inner disposition. It's the same reason that wicked enchanters may have pleasing appearances at the beginning of stories, but by the end they are usually stripped of this appearance and revealed to be hideous.

This is not simply a trope that makes stories easier for children to understand, but a fundamental understanding of the nature of reality. At the deepest level the Good and the Beautiful are transcendental properties of Being, along the the True and the One. They are interchangeable and differ only in notion. The equating of goodness and beauty is good metaphysics. Problems only arise if we make category errors, such as equating a beautiful appearance (category: quality, sub-category: shape) with a beautiful character (category: quality, sub-category: habit or disposition) and beautiful actions (category: action). But the possibility of category errors on our part does not a bad story make.

In his essay "On Fairy-stories," JRR Tolkien said the following:

Even fairy-stories as a whole have three faces: the Mystical towards the Supernatural; the Magical towards Nature; and the Mirror of scorn and pity towards Man. The essential face of Faerie is the middle one, the Magical. But the degree in which the others appear (if at all) is variable, and may be decided by the individual story-teller. The Magical, the fairy-story, may be used as a Mirour de l'Omme; and it may (but not so easily) be made a vehicle of Mystery.

The equating of good characters with beauty and evil characters with ugliness, as well as the transformation of characters' shapes and appearances to match their inner dispositions is part of a fairy-story's use of magic to reveal to the reader something about nature.

Art is revelatory of being and this trope reveals the ontological unity of goodness and beauty. This is true even if such revelation is not something the author necessarily intended. Good characters are not good because they are beautiful, they are beautiful because they are good and fairy-stories often match inner disposition to outer appearance. Insofar as transformations are used to cause outer appearances to match inner dispositions, the trope shows that we should move past appearances to get to the truth. The evil enchantress may appear beautiful, but she is truly ugly. This ugliness is later revealed and made explicit by the lifting of a glamour, or by her transforming into a monster to battle the hero, or some other use of magic that reveals her true character through a change in her appearance.

Some scattered thoughts on metaphysics and the liturgy

Properly speaking, "accidental" does not mean "that which is unimportant." "Accidental" means "that which exists in and through another." There are many accidents that are the furthest thing from unimportant. Indeed, anything that does not possess its perfection by its very nature--i.e. anything that is not God--is made perfect through certain superadded accidents.

Man, for example, is oriented towards his perfection by the virtues and achieves his perfection only through grace. Yet both the virtues and grace are accidental to man, since man is still man without them and since they only exist in and through a rational nature.¹ From this we can see that something can be accidental while still being of the gravest importance.

Which brings me to the topic of the liturgy. These days people are apt to dismiss any criticism of certain aspects of the liturgy--e.g. the type of music used, the design of the vestments worn by the priest, the orientation of the priest with respect to the people &c.--as being criticisms of what is accidental to the liturgy. "The essence of the liturgy," they will say, "is the same as it ever was."

This I will in no way deny. The essence of the liturgy is the same as it ever was: the outpouring of grace for the unification of man with God through the death and resurrection of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, true God and true man, Whose sacrifice and glorified body are again made present to us on the altar when a validly ordained priest says the words of consecration over the proper matter with the proper intention.² The essence of a mass celebrated by priests in a gulag or concentration camp, with matter scrounged from whatever sources are available and words half-remembered, is the same as the essence of a Pontifical High Mass celebrated by the Pope himself.

But bearing that in mind, we must ask ourselves what accidents are appropriate to the liturgy. What accidents are conducive to inculcating in those present at the mass an attitude conducive to the contemplation and love of God? For contemplation and love, I would argue, are the true and definitive acts of active participation.

It would take a wiser and holier man than I to answer this question. But, in closing, I will note one simple fact. Many wiser and holier men than I have lived and discussed these matters. And in so doing they bequeathed to the Church Her patrimony of sacred music, sacred vestments, sacred rites and forms &c. Perhaps we should listen to what they have to say?

¹ I say "in and through a rational nature" rather than "in and through man" because the angels also achieve their final end, viz. God, only through grace.

² I am not quoting this definition of the essence of the liturgy from any one source, but rather formulating it based upon my own understanding. Thus I am open to an correction or modification that it may need.

Briefly on beauty

The beautiful is as much a mode of being as the one, the true and the good. If unity, truth and goodness are objective, then so to is beauty. To say otherwise would be relativism.

A reassesment of a previous point

In this post I said the following: "God is the immediate cause of the existence of everything that exists in the physical world, both substance and accident." I believe I misspoke somewhat.

To whit: "Therefore, as accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist, so they ought to be called rather "concreated" than "created" things; whereas, properly speaking, created things are subsisting beings" (ST, I, q. 45, a. 4c). The word translated in the Benzinger edition as "concreated" is translated as "co-created" in the Blackfriars edition. The Latin term being translated is "concreata" in the Leonine edition. My Latin isn't great, but I believe this is a participle of the verb "concreo," which, if I am not mistaken, means "to create with."

As such, I believe it is incorrect to say that God is the immediate cause of the existence of accidents, since accidents by nature participate in the existence of their subject. It would be more correct to say that God is the principle cause of the existence of everything that exists in the physical world, both substance and accident. The cause of the existence of accidents can be reduced to God, but comes through a mediating cause, viz. substance, rather than immediately. And this may play an important point in relation to an argument I make here regarding the principle cause of evil.

To wit: The effects of an intermediate cause may be reduced to the effects of the first and principle cause insofar as the intermediate cause is subordinate to the first cause. Thus the existence of any accident qua existing and, since that which exists is good insofar as it has existence, qua good is reducible to the causality of God. But insofar as an accident is evil, i.e. insofar as said accident lacks the fullness of being it should possess, it falls outside the order of the first and principle cause, viz. God, since insofar as it lacks the existence it should possess it falls outside the order of existence that the first and principle cause establishes. Thus, the existence of the accident insofar as it is evil cannot be reduced to the first and principle cause. It is rather reducible only to the intermediate cause.

A foolish "philosopher" in need of reproof*

Hail, O Reproof of foolish philosophers! ~Akathist Hymn to the Virgin Mary

Sedes sapientiae, ora pro me!

(With a tip o' the ol' beanie to The Sci Fi Catholic. His post on the issue first brought it to my attention.)

So apparently there is a Christian girl named Gina DeLuca. She attends school at Suffolk County Community College. She is taking an Introduction to Philosophy course. Apparently her "philosophy" professor has used the course as an opportunity to belittle her and her Christian faith and has, it seems, given her poor grades because of her faith. Needless to say, she contacted the American Center for Law and Justice to defend her freedom of religion and to seek a just grade.**

Now, I do not have enough information to competently judge Gina's performance in the course. Maybe the professor is a fool and at the same time Gina actually deserved to be graded poorly rather than the professor's foolishness causing him to act unjustly in giving her a poor grade. That is between Gina, the professor and the school; and now--for better or for worse--the legal system.

The ACLJ's letter to county attorney Christine Malafi can be found here. (WARNING! PDF!) The letter contains some choice quotes from the professor. These I do have the knowledge to competently judge. And so, in the interest of the truth of things and defending the faith, I shall.

To Gina's comment that she "can KNOW the material, without having to BELIEVE it," the professor responds as follows:

[I]t is clear that knowledge is linked to belief and that KNOWLEDGE is a justified true belief. If you do not believe that X is true then you can not claim to know that X is true. What you do is to deceive yourself and others by claiming that "I can KNOW the material, without having to BELIEVE it." What you do is MEMORIZE and REPEAT without understanding. You have no understanding of what it means to know something.***

This is obviously false.

In offering my critique of what the professor says, I will accept the definition of knowledge that he offers, viz. justified, true belief. But even with this definition of knowledge being accepted, the professor is still wrong. He is either guilty of the fallacy of equivocation or of holding to absurdity. The professor is either not addressing the same knowledge that Gina is or he is violating the principle of non-contradiction.

Gina is saying that she can know what a philosopher or school of philosophy taught without having to believe that said philosopher's or school of philosophy's principles, conclusions &c. are true. It is perfectly possible for Gina to believe that some philosopher or school of philosophy taught X, to justify her belief by the reading of primary and secondary sources and for her belief to be true. Thus she would have justified, true belief.

The professor is arguing that Gina cannot know some position of a philosopher or of a school of philosophy is true without believing it. This is equivocation, since it was not at all what she was talking about. Moreover, if the professor actually was talking about knowing what a philosopher or school of philosophy taught rather than knowing that what they taught was true, then his position is absurd. For example, one could not know both what Hegel taught and what Kierkegaard taught, since--according to what the professor has said--knowing what Kierkegaard taught would require holding his positions as true, while knowing what Hegel taught would require holding his positions as true. But this is an impossible absurdity, because Kierkegaard's teachings include teaching that Hegel was wrong! One cannot hold both that Kierkegaard's teachings are true and that Hegel's teachings are true, since Kierkegaard's teachings are that Hegel's teachings are false. One cannot hold both A and not-A at the same time and in the same respect, and that is exactly what the professor is arguing for if he is not equivocating!

The next quote from the professor states the following: "There are problems with any single being having all the properties traditionally assigned to the deity of the Western religions." He then goes on to give some examples of what he believes these "problems" are. There is nothing to indicate that he has any idea that these problems have been answered, nor to indicate that if he knew of these answers he engaged them in some way to show why he believes them to be false. Perhaps he has done so and this was simply not quoted in the letter. Since, however, the letter is all most of us will see of his thoughts on the subject, I will now attempt to answer them point by point.

Objection 1: "If the deity is ALL POWERFUL would it not have the power to create beings that would know what GOOD was without knowing or committing EVIL? If this is not possible then how is the being ALL POWERFUL?"

Reply to Objection 1: According to the Catholic tradition, God did exactly that. Our first parents, in their state of original justice, knew good and not evil. This is because they were human, and thus they had the power to possess intellectual knowledge. Now, that which is primarily known is being. And in knowing being, they also would come to know it as desirable, i.e. as good.

Now, evil is nothing except privation, the lacking of some good in a being that should have that which it lacks. Thus, evil is not being per se, but only per accidens, since it can only exist through something that has being.

Now, the professor is here speaking of moral evil. A moral evil is a human action that lacks the fullness of being proper to it. Ever action can be said to have being insofar as it exists, even though it exists per accidens. To deny that actions have being would be the equivalent of saying that no action ever existed. But if no action ever existed, then no effect of an action could ever exist. This is absurd, so we must admit that actions are beings. In their state of original justice our first parents had not yet committed any actions that lacked the fullness of being proper to human actions. Since evil only exists per accidens, it can only be known through that which exists per se, since that which exists per accidens only exists through that which exists per se. But until our first parents committed an action that lacked the fullness of being proper to human actions, no moral evil existed, since moral evil can only exist through some moral agency, viz. the moral agency of our first parents. Thus, until our first parents committed the original sin and lost for themselves and their posterity original justice, they knew the good, including moral good, without knowing moral evil.

Now, the professor seems to mean not only the actual knowledge or moral evil, but even the potential knowledge of moral evil, since he speaks also of committing evil. Why, if God is all powerful, did He not create beings who did not have the potential to commit moral evil?

To this we must reply as follows: to say that God is omnipotent is not to say that the divine power is capable of bringing into existence all that can be thought. It is to say that the divine power is capable bringing into existence all that is possible to be brought into existence. Now, those things which violate the principle of non-contradiction cannot be brought into existence, because that would require they both exist and not exist at the same time and in the same respect, which is absolutely not possible.

To create a moral agent that is incapable of moral evil would violate the principle of non-contradiction. To wit: A being either possesses its end, the fullness of its existence, its perfection either per se or per accidens. God is ipsum esse subsistens, the fullness of existence itself. Thus only He possesses the fullness of existence per se. All other beings must possess their end and perfection per accidens. This is because any being that is not its own act of existence is a being that receives existence limited by some potency. Now, that which has some potency is capable of possessing accidents. Thus, the perfection of a being that is not its own act of existence is through superadded accidents which actualize its potentialities in proper proportion to its nature. For example, man is perfected by acquiring those habits called virtues.

But insofar as a being is capable of possessing accidents of certain modes, it is not only capable of acquiring and possessing those accidents which bring about its perfection. It must also be capable of not acquiring those accidents that would bring about its perfection--as man is capable of not possessing grace--or of possessing accidents that are contrary to its perfection--as man is capable of possessing those habits called vices that are contrary to virtue. Thus any being that is not its own act of existence, that does not possess its perfection per se, must be capable of failing to achieve its perfection. Now, any limited moral agent possess potentiality insofar as it is limited. Thus any limited moral agent must not just be capable of acting to acquire the accidents that are its perfection, but also of acting in such a manner as to fail to acquire said perfecting accidents or to acquire their contraries. And thus the existence of a limited moral agent that is incapable of doing moral evil is a contradiction, since to be a limited moral agent is to be able to do moral evil by definition.

Now, the professor might ask "Why then did God not create unlimited moral agents?" But this to would be a contradiction. Beings are differentiated by their potency. A man, for example, is differentiated from other men by his particular matter. But matter is that which is in potency, since it is capable of receiving many different substantial forms. In the same way, immaterial beings are differentiated by their essences, since essence relates to existence as potency relates to act. Only God is unlimited and possesses no potency, since He is ipsum ese subsistens, the subsisting act of existence itself. For God to create another unlimited being would require that He create another being that possesses no potency, another God. But this is impossible, since the only way to distinguish between God the creator and the created God as different beings would be if the latter contained an admixture of potency. But any being with an admixture of potency is neither God nor unlimited by definition. Thus the creation of unlimited moral agents would violate the principle of non-contradiction, since said created unlimited moral agents would have to both possess potency and not possess potency at the same time and in the same respect.

Objection 2: "If the being must make EVIL to make GOOD then how is the being ALL GOOD?"

Reply to Objection 2: Good does not require evil to exist, but rather vice versa, as was explained above. This suffices to reply to the objection.

Objection 3: "If the being is ALL KNOWING and thus knows in advance that there will be a use of FREE WILL that produces EVIL and then goes and creates FREE WILL then the being has made EVIL and is not ALL GOOD."

Reply to Objection 3: The effect of a middle cause can only be reduced to the first cause insofar as said middle cause is subordinate to the first cause. Insofar as a middle cause goes outside the order of the first cause, the effects of said middle cause are reducible only to the middle cause, not to the first cause. For example, insofar as a student gains knowledge, said knowledge can be reduced to the teacher as first cause, since the teacher teaches in order to bring about knowledge in the student. But insofar as the student remains ignorant, said ignorance is reducible only to the student as cause, since the failure to gain knowledge is outside the order established by the teacher.**** Thus, since evil is, by definition, outside the proper order of things as established by God, evil cannot be reduced to God as cause, but only to the immediate agent.

Objection 4: "Another problem with the deity being ALL PERFECT is that the being would need to possess all perfections and if freedom is a perfection or a good thing as opposed to its opposite being not god [sic] then the deity that is all perfect would also need to be free and yet it cannot be free as it is not free to be or do anything that is less than perfect or the very best possible. As it cannot be free it is NOT ALL PERFECT."

Reply to Objection 4: This does not follow. Something is not said to lack freedom because it is not able to do what is not in its nature to do or be what is not in its nature to be. For example, man is not said to lack freedom because he is not capable of flight under his own power. Nor is man said to lack freedom because he cannot be a stone. Thus God cannot be said to lack freedom because He is incapable of doing what is not in His nature to do and being what is not in His nature to be.

Now, the professor might respond that this answer is opposed to the divine omnipotence, but this would be speaking falsely. As was stated above, the divine omnipotence consists in being capable of bringing into existence all that which is capable of being brought into existence. And as was also stated above, that which is not capable of being brought into existence is that which violates the principle of non-contradiction. For God to do what is not in His nature to do or be what is not in His nature to be would violate the principle of non-contradiction, since it would require Him to both be and not be God at the same time and in the same respect.

Here ends the professor's objections and my replies to them.

The professor states that "there are problems with the SET OF BELIEFS associated with the one deity of the Western religions." But if this is true it certainly does not follow from the arguments he has presented.

The final statement of the professor quoted in the letter is as follows:

Now for those who believe in the GOD of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition they must believe in a single being with characteristics of being: SUPREME, ALL POWERFUL, ALL GOOD, ALL PERFECT, ALL KNOWING, ETERNAL etc... Why must they? Well, because they have no choice either they believe in the GOD of those traditions or else they make up their own ideas and they are then actually moving out of those traditions and are giving good example of the post modern relativistic, subjectivist tradition of the Twentieth Century. The religions of the West have very clear ideas about the DEITY they have at the center of their beliefs. These religions have doctrines and dogma that the faithful must accept.

How would I respond to this?

I would agree with it. Insofar as I am Catholic "I believe and profess all that the Holy Catholic Church believes, teaches, and proclaims to be revealed by God." That is what it means to be Catholic. But what of it? Nothing about this makes what I believe absurd or illogical. The professor has certainly not, as far as I know, written anything that demonstrates my faith to be such. Indeed, in my own personal life I spent a large part of my undergraduate studies slipping away from the Catholic Church and the faith of my fathers because other things provided more immediate and powerful enjoyment. I was a deist at best, an agnostic at worst. It was not until I began the study of philosophy that I realized that the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church possessed the fullness of Truth. The idea that philosophy and reason are opposed to faith is absurd, as any competent study of the history of western philosophy would show.

I do not know if Gina has a case against her professor for being unjust in his grading. But she certainly has a powerful case for his being a fool.*****

* I say "philosopher" because error is not philosophy. It is rather the abuse of philosophy, as the Angelic Doctor says in his In Boeth. de Trin, q. II, a. 3c.

** N.B. Apparently the chief council for the ACLJ has come out in favor of waterboarding. This is bad, since torture is intrinsically evil (See Gaudium et Spes, 27; Veritatis Splendor, 80). It does not, however, undermine the justice of Gina's claim.

*** All formatting as in original letter.

**** This example assumes that the teacher truly and properly teaches.

***** "Fool" being taken in its philosophical definition, viz. "one who does not possess wisdom."

Some thoughts on intelligent design, creation and evolution

"Do you believe in creation or evolution?"

Yes.

"Do you believe in intelligent design? Do you believe intelligent design is science? Are you a creationist?"

Define your terms. What do you mean by 'intelligence', 'design', 'intelligent design', 'science', 'creation' and 'creationism'?

Moreover, have you solved the demarcation problem? Have you published that paper yet? Where has it been published? I would dearly like to read it.

Questions: Can design be unintelligent? Does not 'design' imply planning, intent and mind? Would 'unintelligent design' not be a contradiction?

If 'science' is that which can be known by empirical observation and repeatable experiment, is evolution really science? Has anyone every observed macro-evolution? Has anyone ever seen one species give birth to a new and different species? What experiments can one do under controlled circumstances to prove the theory? These are real questions, not rhetorical ones. I would appreciate real answers and real sources to go to in order to improve my knowledge.

Did Darwin defend his theory via laboratory experiment, or only thought experiment? Was not his whole argument based on the fact that his theory best fit the observed data? If this worked for Darwin, why not for Behe, et alii? Allowing them to take part in the conversation is not the same as admitting that they are correct.

At the end of the day I am and remain a Thomist. Whichever side is correct is interesting and important to the truth of things. But whichever side is correct has no effect whatsoever on the question of the existence of God.

God is the immediate efficient cause of all things because He is the immediate efficient cause of their acts of existence. God is required, no matter which theory of the physical processes involved in the origins of life is correct. Eliminate God and you do not have self-sufficient nature. You have nothing.

Edited to add:

It seems that I have committed the fallacy of equivocation, as the comments should demonstrate. To clarify, when I asked "Has anyone ever seen one species give birth to a new and different species?" I was not using the term "species" in its biological sense, which would be the mode of signification that I appeared to be using since I was, at least in part, discussing biology. It might be better to ask, "Has anyone ever seen a being with one ontological mode of existence produce a being of a superior ontological mode of existence?" I am primarily interested in metaphysics, not biology, though I am indeed interested in the biology insofar as it is a part of observable reality that needs to be taken into account when discussing metaphysics.

Some thoughts on the second way

St. Thomas' second proof for the existence of God is an argument from the nature of the efficient cause. He begins with the fact that there exists in the world an order of efficient causes. He goes on to say that we know of nothing that is the efficient cause if itself. Indeed, this would be impossible because for something to be the efficient cause of itself it would need to exist before it could cause itself to exist, which is absurd. Now, it is impossible for us to go to infinity in efficient causes, since if there was no first efficient cause there would be no subsequent efficient causes and thus there would be no effect, which is plainly false. Thus there must be some uncaused cause, which is God.

A problem often arises in how people think about the second way. Since the proof depends on the fact that there cannot be an infinite chain of efficient causes, people often think that it is speaking of God as the first link in the causal chain of the universe. God started the big bang and everything went on from there. This is not the proper way to think about the second way.

As readings in the rest what has come to be called St. Thomas' treatise on God will show, St. Thomas is primarily thinking of God as the efficient cause of existence. Thus God cannot be viewed as simply the first link in the causal chain of the universe. Rather, God is the cause of existence for any and every link in any and every causal chain. He is the cause of the existence of the agent, the action and the effect. Thus God does not cause you simply because He is the cause of the big bang, without which you would not exist. God is the immediate efficient cause of your act of existence.

Nothing in this is opposed to the efficient causality of your parents in your coming to be. The efficient causality of your parents and the efficient causality of God are not incompatible. The causality of your parents and the causality of God are causes on two different levels of reality, physical and metaphysical.

The important thing to remember is that the entire causal chain on the physical level of reality is dependent on the metaphysical causality of God. God is the cause of the existence of your parents. He is the cause of the existence of the conjugal act in which you were conceived. He is the cause of your existence. God is the immediate cause of the existence of everything that exists in the physical world, both substance and accident.

The invalidity of an argument that stems from scientific materialism

Neurological research ha been done in which people's brains are observed while they undergo changes in their subjective internal states. By this I mean that they are told to try to bring about certain thoughts, ideas, emotions, intentions &c. The researchers can then correlate these internal states with the brain states that they observe. This tells them more about the structure of the brain and its relationship to our thoughts, emotions &c. Certainly a noble and interesting area of research, one that might be useful in the diagnosing and treating of certain physical and chemical disorders that might lead to mental and emotional problems.

But scientific materialist do more than recognize the measurable correlation between these subjective internal states and their correlating brain states. They argue that the cause of these subjective internal states are the correlating brain states. The argument goes as follows:

If a person is subject to some internal state, then their brain has a brain state that corresponds to that internal state.

A person's brain has a brain state that corresponds to some internal state.

Therefore the person is subject to that internal state.

This is an invalid argument. While the conditional statement is simply a restatement of the research data, the rest of the argument is an example of the fallacy of affirming the consequent.

It may be true that particular brain states are necessary for certain subjective internal states. But this is certainly not a problem for an Aristotelian or a Thomist, whose philosophical psychology and philosophical anthropology requires the activity of the internal senses for any kind of thought: "The Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 1; Poster. ii, 15) that the principle of knowledge is in the senses" (Summa Theologiae I, q. 84, a. 6 sed contra). It does not follow from the research, however, that particular brains states are a sufficient reason for certain subjective internal states. If scientific materialists are correct, at least insofar as human nature is concerned, they will have to do more than point to these kinds of studies to prove it.

Some thoughts on the two creation stories in Genesis

It seems that many people hold that there are two creation stories in the book of Genesis, viz. Genesis 1:1-2:3 and Genesis 2:4-25. I've been thinking about theses a little over the past few weeks, in part because we discussed them in the RCIA class that I help to teach at my parish. For whatever they are worth, here are my reflections on the two stories.

The two stories, if we must in fact read them as two stories*, are not contradictory. Rather, they are complimentary. The first story of creation gives us an ontological understanding of the physical world, while the second story of creation gives us a teleological understanding of the physical world.

The first story of creation leads us up the great chain of beings insofar as it is discernible in the physical world. It begins with that which is formless, moves up through the elements and non-living things, to vegetative life, to animal life, and finally to man, who is the highest physical being because he is both body and spirit. Each of these things God pronounces as good, since each of them in some way shares in the divine essence through the limited participation that gives them existence. The whole together is very good because God has rendered it a properly ordered whole through the relationship of its diverse modes of being and its diverse number and types of species. Finally, God rests, showing us that He is whole and perfect in Himself, having no need for that which He has created. Yet He also blesses and sanctifies the seventh day, showing us that He loves that which He freely chose to create out of His gratuitous love.

The second story of creation shows us how the physical world is ordered towards its end. God first creates man, breathing into him the breath of His spirit. Man is thus a rational, spiritual and embodied soul who is ordered to God as his end. This being ordered to God is later reinforced by the fact that God lays down certain rules for the man.

God then creates the world for man, who is given authority over it and the duty to keep it, and creates animals which he brings to man. Man names these animals as another sign of his authority over creation. This creation of other things after man and placing them in his authority shows that they are ordered towards God through being ordered towards the use of man for his survival, licit enjoyment and use in the worship and praise of God.

Finally, God says that it is not good for man to be alone, showing us how friendship and community are necessary for properly living and ordering our lives towards God. Woman is created last for two reasons. First, to show us that the complementary relationship that exists between the sexes is special and unique from the relationship man has with any other created thing. Second, to show us that we can achieve our end of union with God either through a life that is chaste--viz. religious life, celibate priesthood &c.--or through a life of properly ordered sexual love--viz. permanent marriage. And man and woman were naked and unashamed because they still lived in innocence and possessed their original justice and grace.

So we an see that the second story shows us how creation is ordered towards God as its end. Man is ordered to God Himself, and it follows from this that we owe obedience to Him and His commands. In being ordered to God we are also ordered in our relationship to the physical world. With regard to our fellow men we are called to friendship and community. Insofar as we are sexual beings we are ordered towards complementarity union with the opposite sex, and insofar as this union may itself be sexual we are ordered towards permanency. The rest of creation is ordered towards God through being ordered towards the our use, and as such is put under our authority. But this authority must be used for stewardship, not for despotism.

* Because it seems perfectly possible to read what is called the second story of creation as simply a more detailed look at the creation of man, followed by forming the Paradise for him by God and followed by him being invested with his authority of stewardship over creation.