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A distinction between human life and the presence of a human soul is not philosophically tenable. Or at least not insofar as many who put it forward attempt to use St. Thomas Aquinas as support for their position.
It is true that St. Thomas, following the received embryology of his day, did not believe that the ensoulment of an immortal, rational soul happened until some few months after conception. What is never mentioned is that, given St. Thomas' understanding of the relationship between body and soul, this means that there was no human life until after the ensoulment of an immortal, rational soul.
The soul is the substantial form of the body. This means that the soul makes the body be the kind of being that it is and grants to it all the powers that it possesses. Now, a human being is a rational animal. This means that it possesses a rational soul, from which stem its powers of intellect and will. But, since the soul is the substantial form of the body, this rational soul is also the origin of a man's vegetative and animal powers, i.e. the powers of life, reproduction, growth, nutrition, sensation and local motion.
Now, in the received embryology of the day, the being in the womb after conception first possessed only a vegetative soul. Thus it possessed only the powers of vegetative life, nutrition, growth. After some development this vegetative soul was replaced by an animal soul. Thus the being no longer had simply vegetative life, but animal life. Thus, in addition to the powers of nutrition and growth it now began to develop the powers of sensation and local motion, as seen through the development of sense organs and limbs. Finally, when this animal development had reached a fitting stage, God would infuse the being with an immortal, rational soul. Animal life would now be replaced by human life, and the rational soul would be the origin not only of the powers of nutrition, growth, sensation and local motion, but also of the powers of intellect and will.
As this brief sketch hopefully makes clear, there was no human life before the infusion of an immortal, rational, human soul. For to have a human life is to be a human being, to be a human being is to be a rational animal, and to be a rational animal is have an immortal, rational soul.
Thus those who would use St. Thomas as cover for their pro-abortion positions demonstrate only that they know nothing of St. Thomas. For in St. Thomas there can only be human life were matter is informed by an immortal, rational soul. If it can be demonstrated that human life begins at conception, then, for St. Thomas, it would be demonstrated that a human soul is infused by God and present at the moment of conception. To say otherwise would be to imply a duality between body and soul that is entirely foreign to the thought of St. Thomas.
An interesting note: The Council of Vienna formally declared that "whoever shall obstinately presume in turn to assert, define, or hold that the rational or intellective soul is not the form of the human body in itself and essentially must be regarded as a heretic" (Denzinger, 30th ed., no. 481). The conclusion that can be drawn from this pronouncement and the brief philosophical sketch given above I will leave to the reader.
Showing posts with label Philosophical Anthropology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Philosophical Anthropology. Show all posts
Monday, December 22, 2008
Friday, November 07, 2008
A bit on marriage basics
What is essential to marriage? It is essential to marriage that the couple, by being the kind of couple it is, is ordered towards having children. That is the basic essence of marriage.
A couple that consists of a man and a woman, by being the kind of couple that it is, is ordered towards having children. This is true even is this particular couple, consisting of this man and this woman, is not capable of having children due to age or infertility. It is even true if this man and this woman use contraception to prevent themselves from having children. The universal, i.e. being this type of couple, is essential. The particular, i.e. being this particular couple, is accidental.
A couple that consists of two men or two women is not ordered towards having children. This is true by virtue of being the kind of couples they are. Neither two men nor two women are capable of making a baby. This is not due to being this particular couple, but to being this type of couple. It is not accidental, it is essential. As such, neither two men nor two women are capable of marriage.
I hope that clears it up for everyone who tries to argue for same sex "marriage" by arguing that we do not make heterosexual couples prove they will not use contraception before the government considers them married. Such arguments are fallacious. They are examples of the fallacy of the accident.
A couple that consists of a man and a woman, by being the kind of couple that it is, is ordered towards having children. This is true even is this particular couple, consisting of this man and this woman, is not capable of having children due to age or infertility. It is even true if this man and this woman use contraception to prevent themselves from having children. The universal, i.e. being this type of couple, is essential. The particular, i.e. being this particular couple, is accidental.
A couple that consists of two men or two women is not ordered towards having children. This is true by virtue of being the kind of couples they are. Neither two men nor two women are capable of making a baby. This is not due to being this particular couple, but to being this type of couple. It is not accidental, it is essential. As such, neither two men nor two women are capable of marriage.
I hope that clears it up for everyone who tries to argue for same sex "marriage" by arguing that we do not make heterosexual couples prove they will not use contraception before the government considers them married. Such arguments are fallacious. They are examples of the fallacy of the accident.
Tuesday, September 09, 2008
On rights
Take a man. Remove him from all historic and social context. Take him as a lone, autonomous individual. What rights does he have?
A liberal--either a left-liberal or one of those right-liberals we erroneously call "conservatives"--would probably be able to produce a short, or even a long, list. Certainly the left-liberal list and the right-liberal list would differ somewhat in content and emphasis, but either kind of liberal would be able to produce a list. Both lists would be wrong.
The correct answer is "none." A man possesses no rights when he is removed from all historic and social context. If such a thing as a lone, autonomous individual existed, he would exist without any rights whatsoever.
It is a good thing, then, that there is no such thing as a lone, autonomous individual. Man, as a bodily and incarnate being, always exists within a historic and social context. And it is only within this historic and social context that the concept of "rights" has any meaning at all.
A "right" is not a quality. Rights exist as complements to duties. Both only exist as relations within the context of relationships. A relation is a reference to another. To say one has a right means that one is owed something by another. One cannot speak of this right without referencing, at least implicitly, said other. To say one has a duty means that one owes something to another. One cannot speak of this duty without referencing, at least implicitly, said other.
This, then, is why it is absurd to speak of rights as existing when removed from historic and social context. A man exists within a particular time and place. This particular time and place governs the context of a man's relationships. And it is only within said relationships that the idea of rights has any actual content.
A liberal--either a left-liberal or one of those right-liberals we erroneously call "conservatives"--would probably be able to produce a short, or even a long, list. Certainly the left-liberal list and the right-liberal list would differ somewhat in content and emphasis, but either kind of liberal would be able to produce a list. Both lists would be wrong.
The correct answer is "none." A man possesses no rights when he is removed from all historic and social context. If such a thing as a lone, autonomous individual existed, he would exist without any rights whatsoever.
It is a good thing, then, that there is no such thing as a lone, autonomous individual. Man, as a bodily and incarnate being, always exists within a historic and social context. And it is only within this historic and social context that the concept of "rights" has any meaning at all.
A "right" is not a quality. Rights exist as complements to duties. Both only exist as relations within the context of relationships. A relation is a reference to another. To say one has a right means that one is owed something by another. One cannot speak of this right without referencing, at least implicitly, said other. To say one has a duty means that one owes something to another. One cannot speak of this duty without referencing, at least implicitly, said other.
This, then, is why it is absurd to speak of rights as existing when removed from historic and social context. A man exists within a particular time and place. This particular time and place governs the context of a man's relationships. And it is only within said relationships that the idea of rights has any actual content.
Tuesday, August 12, 2008
On artificial intelligence
I have been, for whatever reason, thinking a bit about artificial intelligence (AI). More precisely, I have been thinking about what is generally called "strong AI," i.e. artificial intelligence that matches or supersedes the human intellect, the kind you see in science fiction books and movies. My thinking has led me to believe that such a thing will never be.
First, the intellect is, for lack of a better term, a substantial or essential power. Its origin is in the substantial form, the essence, the nature of the being that possesses it. No machine possesses a substantial form. Rather, any machine qua machine possesses only an accidental form that is brought about through the organization of parts. These parts may be composed of a substance or substances, but the machine itself exists only insofar as said substance or substances are given certain shapes and arranged within certain relations. Since a machine possesses no substantial form, it cannot possess, qua machine, any power that has its origin in substantial form, and thus it cannot possess intellect.
Second, the intellect is a purely immaterial, spiritual power. It does not depend on matter for its operation, either the matter of the knower or the matter of the thing known. While in some intellectual beings, viz. man, matter may be required to provide the intellect with the forms it uses in its operation through the external and internal senses, this is accidental to the operation of the intellect qua intellect. Now, man does not have the power to create immaterial being. As such, man does not have the power to create intellect.
Third, is anyone familiar with the "Chinese room" argument of analytic philosopher John Searle? I have only a slight familiarity with it, but I believe it goes something like this: Take a man who understands no Chinese and put him in a room filled with data on the rules of the language, such as grammar, structure, likely replies to certain inquiries &c. Have a Chinese speaker try to communicate with the man through writing. Given enough time and enough data on the language, the man will be able to respond to the Chinese speaker in a way that is both grammatically correct and makes sense to the Chinese speaker. The Chinese speaker will believe he is having a meaningful conversation with the man in the room, but the man in the room will have no idea as to what the conversation is about. I find this argument interesting because it demonstrates the difference between manipulating symbols and understanding them.
St. Thomas, if I am not mistaken, held that words carry with them the form of things. The origin of words, whether written or spoken, is in the internal word, the knowledge of a thing possessed by the soul. The use of words is not just the manipulation of symbols, but is instead the transmission if intelligibility and form. The word directs one beyond itself to the thing in itself as it can be known by the soul.
Then there is a difference between instinct, stimulus/response, or rule based communication and true intellectual communication. The former has its origin in some amount of in-built rules that determine the response to certain stimuli. The latter goes beyond the perception of the stimuli and the interaction of the one who produced the stimuli and the one who responds to them, referencing a third being whose intelligibility and form the words carry and to whom the writer or speaker of the words directs the intellect of the one who receives them. The former happens only on the level of the sensible, while the latter transcends the sensible, using it to direct eh light of reason to investigate some communicated piece of reality.
Anyway, those are just some random thoughts I've had in the last few days. Any critiques, discussion or interesting references would be much appreciated.
First, the intellect is, for lack of a better term, a substantial or essential power. Its origin is in the substantial form, the essence, the nature of the being that possesses it. No machine possesses a substantial form. Rather, any machine qua machine possesses only an accidental form that is brought about through the organization of parts. These parts may be composed of a substance or substances, but the machine itself exists only insofar as said substance or substances are given certain shapes and arranged within certain relations. Since a machine possesses no substantial form, it cannot possess, qua machine, any power that has its origin in substantial form, and thus it cannot possess intellect.
Second, the intellect is a purely immaterial, spiritual power. It does not depend on matter for its operation, either the matter of the knower or the matter of the thing known. While in some intellectual beings, viz. man, matter may be required to provide the intellect with the forms it uses in its operation through the external and internal senses, this is accidental to the operation of the intellect qua intellect. Now, man does not have the power to create immaterial being. As such, man does not have the power to create intellect.
Third, is anyone familiar with the "Chinese room" argument of analytic philosopher John Searle? I have only a slight familiarity with it, but I believe it goes something like this: Take a man who understands no Chinese and put him in a room filled with data on the rules of the language, such as grammar, structure, likely replies to certain inquiries &c. Have a Chinese speaker try to communicate with the man through writing. Given enough time and enough data on the language, the man will be able to respond to the Chinese speaker in a way that is both grammatically correct and makes sense to the Chinese speaker. The Chinese speaker will believe he is having a meaningful conversation with the man in the room, but the man in the room will have no idea as to what the conversation is about. I find this argument interesting because it demonstrates the difference between manipulating symbols and understanding them.
St. Thomas, if I am not mistaken, held that words carry with them the form of things. The origin of words, whether written or spoken, is in the internal word, the knowledge of a thing possessed by the soul. The use of words is not just the manipulation of symbols, but is instead the transmission if intelligibility and form. The word directs one beyond itself to the thing in itself as it can be known by the soul.
Then there is a difference between instinct, stimulus/response, or rule based communication and true intellectual communication. The former has its origin in some amount of in-built rules that determine the response to certain stimuli. The latter goes beyond the perception of the stimuli and the interaction of the one who produced the stimuli and the one who responds to them, referencing a third being whose intelligibility and form the words carry and to whom the writer or speaker of the words directs the intellect of the one who receives them. The former happens only on the level of the sensible, while the latter transcends the sensible, using it to direct eh light of reason to investigate some communicated piece of reality.
Anyway, those are just some random thoughts I've had in the last few days. Any critiques, discussion or interesting references would be much appreciated.
Saturday, June 21, 2008
An important book
I want to take a moment to bring to everyone's attention a book that I believe to be a major work of philosophy: Phenomenology of the Human Person by Msgr. Robert Sokolowski. I had the pleasure of reading an earlier draft of this book during a course I took with Msgr. Sokolowski last year at CUA. The book is well worth our time.
A review post by Hierothee at Cosmos-Liturgy-Sex.
A review by Fr. James V. Schall, S.J published on Ignatius Insight.
A review post by Hierothee at Cosmos-Liturgy-Sex.
A review by Fr. James V. Schall, S.J published on Ignatius Insight.
Friday, May 16, 2008
On the use of the term "person"
The the term "person" and what it signifies, as it has been handed down to Western civilization through the Christological and Trinitarian deliberation of the early Ecumenical Councils, is primarily an ontological term that signifies a specific mode of being. A person is an individual substance of an intellectual nature. Or, to make more explicit what it means to be a person, we can say that a person: (1) possesses a substantial existence, not an accidental existence; (2) possesses a complete nature; (3) exists per se, possessing the fullness of its existence, its nature, and all its powers and acts; (4) separate from others, meaning that the primary sense of the term "person" refers to a specific individual rather than something universal, though we can use the term analogically to include all types of beings whose nature and mode of being render the individuals of said nature persons; (5) possessing an intellectual nature, i.e. possessing intellect and will.
Any use of the term person that does not fall under this specific definition is analogically related. For example, a legal person is treated as is it possessed a separate, substantial existence, possessing an intellect and will and being the full and sole possessor of all its powers and actions. A corporation, for example, does not possess any of the attributes of a person, but it is treated as such for the purpose of the law. This can be fine and necessary for a well running legal system (though I am myself opposed to corporate personhood). But if we loose site of the primary meaning of the term "person," the one from which any and all analogical uses stem, then we have lost sight of something very important to the proper understanding of human nature and the reality of the world.
Any use of the term person that does not fall under this specific definition is analogically related. For example, a legal person is treated as is it possessed a separate, substantial existence, possessing an intellect and will and being the full and sole possessor of all its powers and actions. A corporation, for example, does not possess any of the attributes of a person, but it is treated as such for the purpose of the law. This can be fine and necessary for a well running legal system (though I am myself opposed to corporate personhood). But if we loose site of the primary meaning of the term "person," the one from which any and all analogical uses stem, then we have lost sight of something very important to the proper understanding of human nature and the reality of the world.
Saturday, April 19, 2008
On the kind of being possessed by the "product of conception"
As I have previously discussed here, a substance is a particular being, something that exists in and through itself. It must be a being that is whole in itself and distinct from all other particular beings. Let us then ask ourselves the following question: Is the being that comes into existence at conception a particular being?
Yes. It is a distinct being that is whole in itself, not a part of another being. If this were false, then any and every part of the being that comes into existence at conception would be a part of the pregnant woman. Thus, pregnant woman would eventually be two headed, four armed, four legged &c. Some of them would even be hermaphrodites. This is absurd. Thus, the being that comes into existence at conception is a particular being.
If this is so, the question that arises next is: What type of being is this particular being? It is human. It is a being that posses a full human genome. Science can tell us that.
The next question we must ask is: Is this newly existing human being a person? A person is an individual substance of a intellectual nature. We have already demonstrated that this being must be taken as a substance rather than as an accident or as something that is solely a part of another being. And since we are talking about a particular being rather than the nature of a particular type of being taken as a genus, we must admit that it is an individual substance.
Now we are left to ask whether of not this being has a intellectual nature. This being has been shown to be human. A human being by definition possesses human nature.
So what is human nature? How do we come to know the essence of humanity? Well, how do we come to know the essence of anything? We observe its acts and properties. These show us its powers, which in turn lead us to understand its essence.
So what powers to humans have. There are the basic powers of bodily life: the powers of nutrition and growth which preserve the individual, and the power of generation which preserved the species. There are the sensitive powers of sight, touch &c, which gives a being perception of individual things. And there is the power of intellect, which gives a being perception not just of individuals but also of universal natures. Now, if it is part of human nature to possess an intellect, it follows that human nature is an intellectual nature.
Human beings are persons, since every particular human being is an individual substance of an intellectual nature. The being that comes into existence at conception is a being that possesses a human nature. It follows necessarily then that the being that comes into existence at conception is a person.
Yes. It is a distinct being that is whole in itself, not a part of another being. If this were false, then any and every part of the being that comes into existence at conception would be a part of the pregnant woman. Thus, pregnant woman would eventually be two headed, four armed, four legged &c. Some of them would even be hermaphrodites. This is absurd. Thus, the being that comes into existence at conception is a particular being.
If this is so, the question that arises next is: What type of being is this particular being? It is human. It is a being that posses a full human genome. Science can tell us that.
The next question we must ask is: Is this newly existing human being a person? A person is an individual substance of a intellectual nature. We have already demonstrated that this being must be taken as a substance rather than as an accident or as something that is solely a part of another being. And since we are talking about a particular being rather than the nature of a particular type of being taken as a genus, we must admit that it is an individual substance.
Now we are left to ask whether of not this being has a intellectual nature. This being has been shown to be human. A human being by definition possesses human nature.
So what is human nature? How do we come to know the essence of humanity? Well, how do we come to know the essence of anything? We observe its acts and properties. These show us its powers, which in turn lead us to understand its essence.
So what powers to humans have. There are the basic powers of bodily life: the powers of nutrition and growth which preserve the individual, and the power of generation which preserved the species. There are the sensitive powers of sight, touch &c, which gives a being perception of individual things. And there is the power of intellect, which gives a being perception not just of individuals but also of universal natures. Now, if it is part of human nature to possess an intellect, it follows that human nature is an intellectual nature.
Human beings are persons, since every particular human being is an individual substance of an intellectual nature. The being that comes into existence at conception is a being that possesses a human nature. It follows necessarily then that the being that comes into existence at conception is a person.
Tuesday, March 25, 2008
The invalidity of an argument that stems from scientific materialism
Neurological research ha been done in which people's brains are observed while they undergo changes in their subjective internal states. By this I mean that they are told to try to bring about certain thoughts, ideas, emotions, intentions &c. The researchers can then correlate these internal states with the brain states that they observe. This tells them more about the structure of the brain and its relationship to our thoughts, emotions &c. Certainly a noble and interesting area of research, one that might be useful in the diagnosing and treating of certain physical and chemical disorders that might lead to mental and emotional problems.
But scientific materialist do more than recognize the measurable correlation between these subjective internal states and their correlating brain states. They argue that the cause of these subjective internal states are the correlating brain states. The argument goes as follows:
If a person is subject to some internal state, then their brain has a brain state that corresponds to that internal state.
A person's brain has a brain state that corresponds to some internal state.
Therefore the person is subject to that internal state.
This is an invalid argument. While the conditional statement is simply a restatement of the research data, the rest of the argument is an example of the fallacy of affirming the consequent.
It may be true that particular brain states are necessary for certain subjective internal states. But this is certainly not a problem for an Aristotelian or a Thomist, whose philosophical psychology and philosophical anthropology requires the activity of the internal senses for any kind of thought: "The Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 1; Poster. ii, 15) that the principle of knowledge is in the senses" (Summa Theologiae I, q. 84, a. 6 sed contra). It does not follow from the research, however, that particular brains states are a sufficient reason for certain subjective internal states. If scientific materialists are correct, at least insofar as human nature is concerned, they will have to do more than point to these kinds of studies to prove it.
But scientific materialist do more than recognize the measurable correlation between these subjective internal states and their correlating brain states. They argue that the cause of these subjective internal states are the correlating brain states. The argument goes as follows:
If a person is subject to some internal state, then their brain has a brain state that corresponds to that internal state.
A person's brain has a brain state that corresponds to some internal state.
Therefore the person is subject to that internal state.
This is an invalid argument. While the conditional statement is simply a restatement of the research data, the rest of the argument is an example of the fallacy of affirming the consequent.
It may be true that particular brain states are necessary for certain subjective internal states. But this is certainly not a problem for an Aristotelian or a Thomist, whose philosophical psychology and philosophical anthropology requires the activity of the internal senses for any kind of thought: "The Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 1; Poster. ii, 15) that the principle of knowledge is in the senses" (Summa Theologiae I, q. 84, a. 6 sed contra). It does not follow from the research, however, that particular brains states are a sufficient reason for certain subjective internal states. If scientific materialists are correct, at least insofar as human nature is concerned, they will have to do more than point to these kinds of studies to prove it.
Saturday, March 01, 2008
On the Use of Language as a Sign of Rationality
Here is a paper on the difference between the use of language by human beings and what appears to be the use of language by apes:
Dennis Bonnette, A Philosophical Critical Analysis of Recent Ape-Language Studies.
See also:
Walker Percy, Lost in the Cosmos: The Last Self-Help Book.
Idem, The Message in the Bottle: How Queer Man is, How Queer Language Is, and What One Has to Do With the Other.
Robert Sokolowski, Phenomenology of the Human Person.
The last book has not yet been released, but I was fortunate enough to take a graduate class with Msgr. Sokolowski where we used an earlier draft of it as our text.
Further references on the topic would be appreciated.
Dennis Bonnette, A Philosophical Critical Analysis of Recent Ape-Language Studies.
See also:
Walker Percy, Lost in the Cosmos: The Last Self-Help Book.
Idem, The Message in the Bottle: How Queer Man is, How Queer Language Is, and What One Has to Do With the Other.
Robert Sokolowski, Phenomenology of the Human Person.
The last book has not yet been released, but I was fortunate enough to take a graduate class with Msgr. Sokolowski where we used an earlier draft of it as our text.
Further references on the topic would be appreciated.
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