The logic of modernity

At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. ~Planned Parenthood v Casey

I believe that I've written explicitly enough that the killing of George Tiller was murder, and that it was both evil and foolish for Roeder to do so. That being said, let us reason together.

The quote above is, as stated, from the decision in the Supreme Court case Planned Parenthood v Casey. That means, at least insofar as the present day workings of the legal system of these United States goes, that the quoted position is to be taken as a basic principle contained in and protected by the Constitution of the United States. Now assume the following: Roeder defines human life in such a way that abortionists are not included under it, or at least under the category of human life whereby one is protected by a right to not be killed. Or assume Roeder defines the universe in such a way that it is a moral imperative for abortionists to be killed because of what they do. Or assume both, or any similar type of position, or every similar type of position.

Under such an assumption, how can Roeder be prosecuted for murder? He has a basic Constitutional right to define these things for himself, and to do so without any compulsion from the State. That compulsion obviously includes using laws against his position to punish him. This is the same logic that says abortion must be legal, else we would we using "compulsion" to define things like life for people and thus denying them their liberty. If Roeder holds any position similar to the ones given above, then he should be immune from prosecution under the Constitution of the United States as authoritatively interpreted by the United States' Supreme Court.

In other words, the logic of modernity and basic consistency demand that Roeder be free from prosecution by the State. If they were truly consistent, then pro-aborts would be decrying Tiller's murder, but at the same time they would be decrying any attempt to prosecute Roeder. They would admit that they do not like the murder of abortionists. But the answer to that is simple: if you don't like abortionists being murdered, then don't murder one. They would reach across the aisle, extending hands of peace and cooperation, so that both pro-lifers and pro-aborts could work together to make the murder of abortionists safe, legal and rare.

This is what logic would demand. Moderns love to claim the mantle of logic and reason. Let us see if any actually follow their first principles were logic leads.

Abortion and government

There are those who feel that it is acceptable to vote for a pro-abortion politician if their other positions appear to benefit the common good and help reduce the number of abortions. The problem with this position is that reducing the number of abortions, as important as this is, is not enough. If abortion could be completely eliminated in fact but was still legal, then the task is not finished. This is because the legality of abortion is itself an attack on the very foundations of the rule of law and the common good.

As Blessed Pope John XXIII taught in Mater et Magistra, "individual human beings are the foundation, the cause and the end of every social institution" (219). The legality of abortion is a direct assault on the foundation and purpose of the political community itself. The rule of law and the common good are meaningless concepts if innocent human beings are allowed to be legally murdered.

This teaching is reaffirmed and made even more explicit in Servant of God Pope John Paul II’s encyclical Evangelium Vitae: "Disregard for the right to life, precisely because it leads to the killing of the person whom society exists to serve, is what most directly conflicts with the possibility of achieving the common good" (72). One cannot truly work towards the common good by ignoring the legality of abortion. The legality of abortion necessarily undermines the common good.

A candidate who runs on a pro-abortion platform essentially states that he will not work towards the purpose of government, i.e. the common good. He renders his administration incapable of benefiting the common good in any way except accidentally. This is because the very nature his administration's position attacks the common good by enabling the legal attack on the lives of the unborn.

Any attempt to put forward a pro-abortion politician as an acceptable candidate fails. A candidate who promises to attack the very foundation and purpose of government, the good of life on which all the rest of the common good depends, can never be acceptable.

What intentions can and cannot do, part I

Suppose that law makers passed a law that demanded all $100 bills be printed in blue ink. But further suppose that those law makers, in passing this law, really intended that all $100 bills be printed in red ink. Would it be a false interpretation of the law to rule that printing $100 bills in blue ink was in keeping with the law, while printing $100 bills in red ink was a violation of the law? Do the intentions of the law makes force "blue" to mean red?

Just in case

Just in case its removed for being "offensive," I thought I would share my comment (EDIT: posted on the Washington Post's site) on this opinion piece :

"All Beliefs Welcome, Unless They are Forced on Others"

I hope the good Professor Doninger will join my continuing campaign to overturn any laws that make it illegal for me to kill those who annoy me. After all, what right does anyone have to force a belief about the immorality of "murder" on me? And besides, "Though shalt not kill," is one of those "Ten Commandments." Thus, not allowing me to kill those who annoy me is equivalent to imposing religion upon me.

Such laws also violate my constitutional rights. The majority opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States of America states, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, that I have, "the right to define [my] own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." I do not believe that those who annoy me are human. Nor do they, it follows, possess human life. To keep me from killing them is to impose upon me a view of "the mystery of human life" that is contrary to my own, which is a grievous violation of my constitutional liberties.

I hope all who read this article are convinced by the sound argument presented and join me in my campaign for my moral and Constitutional right to kill all those who annoy me.

Have I "reducio"-ed enough to make the "absurdum" obvious?

Q&A I

Q: Why do you oppose abortion?

A: I can think of neither a legal nor a moral reason to allow the direct and intentional taking of an innocent human life.

Q: Do you oppose abortion even in cases of rape?

A: Yes. I oppose the direct and intentional taking of an innocent human life.

Q: Do you oppose abortion even in cases of incest?

A: Yes. I oppose the direct and intentional taking of an innocent human life.

Q: Do you oppose abortion even in cases where the life of the mother is or may be in danger?

A: Yes. I oppose the direct and intentional taking of an innocent human life.

Q: What would you say to those who argue that a fetus is not innocent?

A: Guilt and culpability require freedom of choice. No child has any choice whether or not to be conceived. Thus it is fallacious to impute any kind of moral culpability to an unborn child.

Q: What would you say to those who argue that the life of a fetus is not a human life?

A: What else would one call a unique and individual living being that possesses a complete human genetic code? Can anyone give me a name that is more accurate rather than an attempt at obfuscation?

Q: What would you say to those who argue that a fetus is not a unique and individual living being that possesses a complete human genetic code, and thus that a fetus is not a human life?

A: Perhaps they should purchase a simple introduction to embryology. (See here and here for some pertinent quotes from assorted text books.)

"You can't legislate morality!"

What, then, if anything, can one legislate, pray tell?

Look, lets be clear here. The law both prescribes and proscribes human action. All human action is governed by morality. Thus, any legislature, by definition, is the legislation of morality in some way or another. The real question is whether or not it is the legislation of correct morality.

So let us hear no more of this "You can't legislate morality!" twaddle.

Probably the best description of my views on political philosophy as applied to the United States to date

(N.B This was originally a comment to a post over at Mark Shea's. I've done some minor editing.)

Patriotism has little to do with form of government and much to do with land, people, culture and tradition. But insofar as the historic culture and tradition of a people includes and is tied up in certain realities of government, these realities are owed our allegiance more so than others.

The Constitution is no more the cause of the American people than the monarchy was the cause of the French people. But the Constitution is a product of the American people just as the monarchy was the product of the French people. That's why the Vendée were better Frenchmen than any Jacobin.

I think it is more true to say that Patriotism has nothing to do with abstract principles separated from the historic and traditional life of a people. That is why I think that the preamble of the Declaration of Independence is at best a rhetorical tactic to gain support in Lockean Europe and at worst pseudo-philosophical bunk that demonstrates Jefferson's fascination with Enlightenment thought getting the better of his far nobler classical and agrarian republicanism.

The most important part of the Declaration is the section detailing the king's violation of the traditional and historical rights held by the colonists. These rights stem both from the American political tradition of deliberate consent of the governed, which had existed since the Mayflower Compact, and the traditional common law rights of Englishmen, held by the colonists as English citizens and subjects of the crown.

In my view it is erroneous to say that the United States is some grand experiment meant to be the laboratory of political philosophers. But it is just as much an error to say that the patriotism of American citizens can be completely divorced from our form of government. Both views ignore the organic tradition, as historically lived by Americans, which inform the Constitution of the United States.

P.S. One commenter says that he has the same problem celebrating Independence Day as he would have celebrating Bastille Day if he lived in France. This strikes me as an erroneous conflation of the American War for Independence and the French Revolution. Such a conflation is common, but that does not make it correct.

The French Revolution was the violent overthrow of historic and traditional French institutions in the name of abstract principles. The American War of Independence was the severing of political ties between England and the thirteen colonies due to the violation of traditional and historic rights that organically developed over time. One fought against tradition, history and organic society, the other in favor of it.

St. Thomas as originalist

According to St. Thomas, one should always render judgment according to the written law, insofar as the written law does not violate the natural law (ST, II-II, q. 60, a. 5).

Earlier, in discussing the question of whether or not one must always act according to the letter of the law, St. Thomas argues that one can sometimes ignore what appears to be the letter of the law in favor of the intention of the lawgiver. Now, one objection states that only he who made the law can interpret it, the obvious reason being that he knows his own mind on the matter and what he meant when he wrote the law (ST, I-II, q. 96, a. 6 ob. 2).

In responding to this objection, St. Thomas argues that one who acts according to the intention of the law does not interpret it simply. That is to say, they are neither giving the law its meaning nor interpreting it for themselves. Rather, they are acting according to its meaning and interpreting it in light of the meaning intended by the legislator (ST, I-II, q. 96, a. 6 ad 2).

Now, the discussion of the letter of the law was focused on those who live under the law and do not have the authority to make or judge laws for the community. Yet this discussion points to two important points. First, interpreting the law is not just a matter of the letter of the law, but also of the intentions behind the letter. Second, when necessity does not demand immediate action in the face of certain risk, the interpretation of the law and judgment on whether or not a dispensation is in order is not something that can be done by any citizen, but only by those to whom the authority is given (ST, I-II, q. 96, a. 6c).

How, then, are those in authority to interpret the law? First, they must judge by the written law. Second, the written law is not simply the text, but also the intention behind the text. Thus one who has the authority to interpret the law and render judgment according to the law must seek to understand the intentions of those who wrote and promulgated it. Now, I am no great legal scholar, but this seems to be the very definition of originalism. Thus it would seem that St. Thomas position on interpreting and judging according to the law is the originalist position.

Rights, duties, relationships and justice

I hate talk of "rights" because it is so often void of content. Rights do not exist except as the result of duties, both of which exits only within the context of relationships, which are in turn governed by justice. If you do not speak about "rights" in connection with these other three things, then you are not speaking about anything at all.

A right is, by definition, something which a person is due from some other person, people or entity. If you are due something from someone, then they--again, by definition--have a duty to render to you that which you are due. So rights do not exist except where duties exist and vice versa. One cannot exist without the other.

And neither can exist except within a relationship, since their very existence demands that a relationship exists. A relationship is, at its simplest, a reference to another. If I have a duty, it references the one I have the duty to by definition. The same is true with a right. The nature of the relationship that exists depends upon how the relationship came into existence and who the relationship is between. The relationship's nature governs what rights and duties are present within it.

Justice is the virtue of rendering to each what they are due. Someone is due something because he has a right to it and another has a duty to provide it for him. These rights and duties exist within the relationship and depend upon its nature. Thus justice rules what rights and duties exist within what relationships.

As such, rights are not the starting point in a discussion of ethics and politics. The starting point is what type of relationship exists and what justice says about it. For it is only from these that rights and duties can be derived.

Maybe it's not as broken as I thought

Perhaps the Constitution isn't dead yet.

Yep, it's broken

(Why? Because I'm feeling rather pessimistic today.)

Whose Presidency will leave us with a better country in four to eight years, Barack Obama or John McCain?

The fact that people are seriously asking and trying to answer this question is proof that the American Constitutional system is horribly broken, possibly beyond repair. The President should have little or no power to do anything that would so drastically affect the situation in our country.

Congress is the preeminent branch of the federal government. The President and the Courts are bound by the laws of Congress as well as the Constitution, since the Executive exists to enforce the laws passed by the Legislature and the Judiciary exists to rule on whether or not particular instances of governmental activity or state and local law violate the laws passed by the Legislature. Congress is bound only by itself and the Constitution (since the Constitution grants it its powers, since it is in charge of its own internal laws and since it is in charge of trying impeachments).

Moreover, the scope of the power and authority of the federal government is itself proscribed by the Constitution. The federal government has only those powers explicitly given to it. The States have all powers except those explicitly denied to them. The States are sovereign in all areas but those areas where they gave up sovereignty to enter into union under the Constitution. So not only should Congress have a greater effect on the country than either the President or the Supreme Court, but State and local officials should have a greater effect on the life of their citizens than any federal official should.

The whole thing is upside-down and bass-ackwards. The only positive is that it will almost certainly fall apart sooner rather than later. The continental United States is far too large to be so centralized and survive. Its all a matter of scale.

Why being in favor of the capital punishment is not in opposition to being pro-life

It would seem that: No one who is in favor of capital punishment can be called pro-life, for "pro-life" means that one is in favor of protecting the life of all men, but being in favor of the use of capital punishment means that one is in favor of the death of some men. But the premises "no man should be killed" and "some men should be killed" are in contradictory opposition to each other, and thus if one is true, the other must be false; and conversely, if one is false, the other must be true. Therefore it is impossible to be both pro-life and in favor of the use of capital punishment.

Sed contra: The relationship between contradictory opposites follows from the principle of non-contradiction, for if both premises in a contradictory relationship were either true or false, then something would both be and not-be at the same time and in the same respect. But from this it must also be admitted that two premises are only in contradictory opposition if holding both would violate the principle of non-contradiction. And this is not necessarily the case with regards to those who are both pro-life and in favor the use of capital punishment. To wit, the premises are not held to both be true in the same respect.

For this to be properly understood, one must first consider the difference between the antecedent and the consequent will. As the Angelic Doctor explains when discussing how the divine will is always fulfilled against the objection that Scripture teaches that God wills all to be saved, yet Scripture and the holy Fathers also teach that not all will be saved (Summa theologiae, I, q. 19, a. 6 ad 1), their is a difference between the antecedent will and the consequent will. This difference is not in the will itself, but in respect to the things willed. That is, a thing may we good or evil in its primary sense and when considered absolutely, and yet after some additional qualities or attributes are consequently considered it may be that the contrary is true.

Absolutely speaking, antecedent to any circumstances, that a man live is good and that he be killed is evil. But consequently to certain qualities or attributes it may be good that some man be executed insofar as it is necessary for the preservation of the commonweal. Thus it may be said that it is possible to have a general willingness that all men live insofar as they are men, and yet will simply that particular men be executed, when this is a just and necessary punishment, and that capital punishment thus be kept legal for this purpose.

Thus it is obvious how one can be both pro-life and in favor of the use of capital punishment. To be pro-life is to have a general willingness that all men live and to will simply opposition to those act or species of acts that unjustly take human life. But to be in favor in favor of capital punishment is to will simply in favor of those acts that justly take human life. And insofar as this is done for the purpose of the protection of the commonweal it is consonant with the general willingness that all men live, since those guilty of capital crimes and justly executed are those who are a danger to the commonweal because they are, by their own choice, a danger to the lives of other citizens.

And now they call it "marriage"

California's top court overturns gay marriage ban, Lisa Leff, Associated Press Writer.

A quote from the majority decision written by Chief Justice Ron George:

Our state now recognizes that an individual's capacity to establish a loving and long-term committed relationship with another person and responsibly to care for and raise children does not depend upon the individual's sexual orientation...

What this means, in effect, is that the state of California now recognizes error as truth and the law of the land.

To begin with, one's ability "to establish a loving and long-term committed relationship with another person" is indeed dependent upon "sexual orientation," if by "a loving and long-term committed relationship with another person" one means a relationship with a sexual aspect. This is because to love someone is to will their good for their own sake. If you are willing to enter into some type of sexual congress with a member of the same sex, then you also will that they enter into sexual congress with you. But such an act is contrary to the nature of the sexual act, since the sexual act is by nature ordered towards procreation and sexual acts between two persons of the same sex are, in their essence, not ordered towards procreation. Thus these sexual acts are evil. And following from that, if you will another to enter into such an act with you, then you are willing them evil. Thus, insofar as you are willing to enter into some warped form of sexual congress with another member of the same sex, you are not loving them. This is necessarily true.

Second, one's ability "to care for and raise children" is also dependent on "sexual orientation," at least insofar as we are talking about the people caring for and raising children being in a sexual relationship with one another. This is because the caring for and raising of children includes not only their material needs, but also their moral and spiritual needs. The very existence of a same-sex sexual relationship between those in charge of the caring for and raising of children presents a moral and spiritual danger to said children. This is because such a relationship teaches children that acts and inclinations that are objectively disordered are instead rightly ordered. The very existence of a same-sex sexual relationship between those charged with the raising of children is a moral and spiritual poison that will lead the children to believe that a lie is the truth and that an evil is a good. Which, I suppose, is par for the course in the modern world.

Ending abortion in the United States

I had previously argued--in the first note in this post--that we do not need to appoint judges to bring about a legal end to abortion in the United States. Rather, we would only need the Congress to strip all Federal courts of their jurisdiction over the issue. Then the battle could be fought on a state by state basis without worrying about any Federal courts overturning laws that eliminate abortion. But, on having rethought the issue, believe that there is an easier way to end abortion in the United States.

Amendment XIV, section 1 of the Constitution of the United States makes it the law of the land that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Now, the problem with this is that the term "person" is never defined within the amendment itself. Thus, we have the many and varied arguments over what constitutes a person, especially over what the legal definition of person should be with regard to Amendment XIV.

But Amendment XIV, section 5 states that "Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." It is obvious that if we are going to attempt to enforce the quoted part of Amendment XIV, section 1, we need a legal definition of "person" so we know who the quoted text in section 1 is referring to. But since it is Congress who has the authority to enforce Amendment XIV via legislation, it falls to Congress to so define the term necessary for said enforcement. Thus, Congress can simply pass a law defining all pre-born human beings as persons from the moment of conception and then outlaw abortion insofar as abortion deprives persons of life without due process.

If a Federal court were to strike down such a law, then the judges who rule as such should be impeached. This would be just because any judge who ruled the law unconstitutional would be setting themselves above the Constitution, since the manifest truth is that Congress has the authority to pass this law based upon Amendment XIV, section 5.

There is no need to fight out the abortion issue in the Federal courts, in the individual states, or with a constitutional amendment. The legislature has the authority to end abortion at any time they wish. All the people need to do is elect pro-life Congressmen and Senators who have the moral courage and strength of conviction to act on this authority.

See also: George W. Carey, In Defense of the Constitution and the review of the same by Edward B. McLean in the fall 1995 issue of the Intercollegiate Review.

On the justice of the current war in Iraq

If a war is to be considered just, then it must be declared by legitimate authority (ST II-II, q. 40, a. 1c; CCC 2309).

In the United States of America the authority to declare war is given to Congress (Constitution of the United States, article I, section 8).

But the current war in Iraq was not declared by Congress.

Therefore the current war in Iraq was not declared by legitimate authority; and from this conclusion it follows that the current war in Iraq is not a just war.

On the Necessity of Voting for the Candidate Who is the "Lesser of Two Evils"

Edits: A few small edits for clarity and the addition of two paragraphs before the concluding one. (And an edit to this disclaimer so I could clarify which two paragraphs were the ones I added.)

In the current race for the next President of the United States it is almost certain that John McCain will be the Republican candidate, while it is certain that either Barack Obama or Hillary Clinton will be the Democratic candidate. I will not vote for any of these candidates. I do not believe that any of them will do what is necessary to protect the unborn. (McCain supports some forms of embryonic stem cell research and I do not trust him to appoint the kind of judges necessary.¹ The problems with both Democratic candidates are, I trust, obvious.) I think all three candidates will use their influence and authority over foreign policy in imprudent and unjust ways. I think all three candidates will use their influence and authority over domestic policy in imprudent and unjust ways.

Now, some would argue that I have a duty to vote for McCain because he is the "lesser of two evils." I think this is false. I think it would be false even if we could adequately agree on a way to quantify the evil of the positions of all three candidates--and I am not at all certain that this is possible. To examine this, let us examine how my vote can effect the outcome of the election

1) Not voting for McCain is not the same thing as voting for the Democrat. If I vote for McCain, I add one vote to his total. If I vote for the Democrat I add one vote to his total. If I vote for neither candidate, I do not add a vote to either candidate's total. Thus, if I do not vote, then neither McCain nor the Democrat's lead or lack thereof is effected in any way. This is not the same outcome as my voting for the Democrat. If I voted for the Democrat, then I would lessen McCain's lead or increase McCain's trailing by one vote.

2) If my vote is the vote that costs McCain the election, then it is impossible for my vote to have been the one to give him the election. If my vote were the single vote that cost McCain the election, then it would be necessary for McCain to have the lost by only one vote. If this is so, then voting for McCain would not give him victory but would only give him a tie with the Democrat. In the same way, if my vote would have won the election for McCain, then my not voting for him will not result in a Democratic victory. It will instead result in a tie. In either case the tie would have to be broken in accordance with the law, something that may or may not be in McCain's favor for any number of reasons. Moreover, the likelihood of such a situation is extremely improbable. It is extremely improbable that my vote will be either the one that failed to give McCain victory or the one that allowed him to be defeated.

3) The national popular vote is not what matters anyway. In truth, the worst my not voting for McCain could do is give the Democratic candidate Pennsylvania's Electoral votes. Pennsylvania currently has 21 votes in the Electoral College. This is certainly not a completely insignificant number, as it is one of the largest number of Electoral votes for a state. But neither does the loss of Pennsylvania mean the loss of the Electoral vote. President Bush failed to win Pennsylvania in both his successful Presidential elections. Thus, everything I said in point 2 still holds, but for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania rather than for the country as a whole.² For my vote to be responsible for McCain's loss of the Presidential election, it would not only have to be true that McCain lost Pennsylvania by only one vote--which, again, is completely improbable--but you would have to prove that is was specifically Pennsylvania's Electoral votes that cost him the Electoral College. But this would seem to be impossible to do, since all the Electors vote at the same time and it is no guarantee that any of the Electors will be faithful. The best chance you would have for arguing that Pennsylvania's Electoral votes were the deciding ones would be if the Democrat won Pennsylvania and won the Electoral College by 21 votes. But for the strongest case, the Democrat would also have to not win any other states whose total electoral votes can be added up to 21. This would include, first and foremost, losing Illinois, which also has 21 electoral votes. And the Democrats have won Illinois in the last two Presidential elections.

Now, since nothing about my choosing to vote for a third party candidate, a write-in candidate or to abstain from voting would require that I will the victory of the Democratic Presidential candidate, let alone require that I will said candidate's evil policy, there is no way that it is formal cooperation with evil. I can, in fact, guarantee that it will not be formal cooperation with evil, since I will not will the victory of the Democratic Presidential candidate--let alone their evil policies--for any reason. Thus, I cannot be said to formally cooperate with evil.

It is also true that my action cannot be said to be immediate material cooperation with evil. For it to be immediate material cooperation evil I would have to act in a way that is necessary for the implementation of the Democratic candidates evil policies. But even if McCain loses Pennsylvania's Electoral votes by one popular vote, and loses the vote in the Electoral College by 21 votes, and the situation is such that it is only Pennsylvania's Electoral votes could be responsible for McCain's loss in the Electoral College, it would still not be true that it is my vote specifically that was necessary for the victory of the Democratic candidate and thus responsible for the implementation of their evil policies. This is because the situation that exists during an election is fluid and one where no particular voter can know all circumstances and variables at the time of his vote, so his vote, when it is cast, cannot be called the exact vote that necessitates the victory of one candidate or the other. But to say that my vote was the one that gave victory to the Democratic candidate would be to treat all other votes as a static existing situation that I can know, which would be false. Moreover, even in the improbable situation outlined above, it would be just as true to say that one of the people who voted for the Democratic candidate was the one whose vote necessitated said candidates victory. And which one would this be? The last one to vote in the entire state? How could any voter know if that was the situation? Thus there is no way to say that my vote or any vote could be immediate material cooperation with evil.

Thus, my vote--or any vote were the voter does not will both the election of the candidate they vote for and the candidates evil policies--can at worst be considered remote material cooperation with evil. And remote material cooperation can be licit if there is a proportionately serious reason for the cooperation, and the importance of the reason for cooperation is proportionate to the causal proximity of the cooperator’s action to the action of the principal agent and there is no danger of scandal. As to the first, I am seeking to avoid the grave evils I believe the other candidates will commit by not supporting them with a vote and--in the case of voting for a third party or write-in candidate--by voting for a candidate who I believe will not be responsible for any evil policies, but will rather work to end of evil policies that are already in place and work to implement policies that will work in favor of the common good. As to the second, with all that has previously been stated it should be obvious that my particular vote is causally remote from the actual election of any particular candidate. As to the third, no one has a right to know how I voted and in talking about it here I have stated explicitly that I will in no way be willing the evil policies of any Presidential candidate when I cast my vote. I do not will any of their immoral policies on abortion, embryonic stem cell research, homosexual "marriage" and adoption, waging an unjust war &c. Because of this, I cannot see how my vote would cause the danger of scandal--inciting or tempting another to commit a morally wrongful act--since I in no way make any excuses for the only action that can be considered immoral and sinful without a doubt, viz. formally cooperating with evil by willing the implementation of a candidates evil policies.

All these considerations have been in light of my understanding of the principles involved in determining whether or not an act is formal or material cooperation with evil. My conclusion is especially influenced by Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger's 2004 letter to Theodore Cardinal McCarrick on the general principles involved in determining whether or not a Catholic is worthy to receive Holy Communion under canon 915. In a final note, former Cardinal Ratzinger state the following:

A Catholic would be guilty of formal cooperation in evil, and so unworthy to present himself for Holy Communion, if he were to deliberately vote for a candidate precisely because of the candidate’s permissive stand on abortion and/or euthanasia. When a Catholic does not share a candidate’s stand in favour of abortion and/or euthanasia, but votes for that candidate for other reasons, it is considered remote material cooperation, which can be permitted in the presence of proportionate reasons.

If a Catholic can vote for a candidate with such serious flaws and not be considered to have committed a grave evil as long as they did so with proportionate reasons, then one should be able to vote for a good candidate who seems unlikely to win or to abstain from voting for either candidate and not be guilty of committing a grave evil for the same reasons. In fact, since the reasons for remote material cooperation have to be proportionate to the evil one is cooperating with, one would be less likely to be guilty of a grave evil by voting for a good candidate who seems unlikely to win or to abstain from voting for either candidate than one would be if one voted for a candidate with evil policies without willing the implementation of said policies.

Keeping all that in mind, I do not think that voting for a third party/write-in candidate or abstaining from voting can even be considered remote material cooperation with evil. Here is why. Those who argue that one who votes or a third party/write-in candidate or abstains from voting is cooperating with evil say that one is doing this because by one's action one divides the vote for the candidate who is the "lesser of two evils." In so doing, the one who votes for a third party/write-in candidate or abstains from voting makes it easier for the worse candidate to win. But this argument assumes that one has the duty to vote for the "lesser of two evils" in the first place. Thus, those who argue that one has the duty to vote for the candidate who us the "lesser of two evils" assume as a premise the point they are arguing for. This is the fallacy of begging the question. And indeed, to even set up an election as a choice between only two candidates--which is what is assumed by anyone who argues that one has the duty to vote for the candidate who us the "lesser of two evil"--is to be guilty of the fallacy of the false dilemma. This should be obvious, since those arguing that one has the duty to vote for the candidate who is the "lesser of two evil" are, at least in part, arguing against those who would vote for a third party/write-in candidate or abstains from voting. Thus the argument is fallacious from the very beginning.

As a final thought, it has been my experience that all those who argue that one must vote for McCain as the "lesser of two evils" do so because "he is better than either of the two possible Democratic candidates and he is the only viable alternative." This is the same kind of thinking that got us John McCain as the (almost certain) Republican Presidential candidate in the first place. Viability is bullplop. If you listen to the talking heads of the media and the punditry and vote for the "only viable candidate," then you are the one who helps make him the only viable candidate by voting for him instead of another candidate who you actually favor. Vote for the person you think is best for the job, even if they are from a third party or need to be written in. If more people did that, then perhaps we would get better elected officials.

Notes:

1. As an aside, the cry of "The judges! We need the judges!" as necessitating pro-lifers to rally around the Republican party is laughable. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution gives Congress the authority to regulate the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. A Republican Congress could easily remove the Court's jurisdiction to rule on cases of abortion, embryonic stem cell research, &c. This would leave us with the same situation that we would be left with if Roe v Wade were overturned: fighting out the legality of abortion on a state by state basis. If you don't think the pro-life cause would win a number of important victories, I can only say I believe that you are mistaken. And nothing about such a solution would require pro-lifers to stop attempting to get an amendment respecting the personhood and right to life of human embryos added to the Constitution.

The fact that the Republican's have not tried strenuously to pass such legislation leads my to believe that they are either incompetent or they do not take the pro-life cause as seriously as they seem to imply they so. Such legislation has been put forward: HR 300, sponsored by Congressman Ron Paul. He also sponsored HR 1094, which would define life as beginning at conception. For more on Ron Paul on life, go here.

2. If there is a tie in the Electoral College or no candidate has a majority, then the President and Vice President are chosen by the House of Representatives and the Senate respectively. I have been unable to find any information on what the law is in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in the case of a tie in the Presidential popular vote.

A Proposed Constitutional Amendment on Personhood

Section 1. All human embryos are considered persons from the moment of their conception and are granted all protections and rights due to persons by the laws of the United States and the laws of any state.

Section 2. Conception is the fertilization of an ovum by a spermatozoon.

Section 3. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.