Tuesday, August 19, 2008

You could say that, but you'd be wrong

As I've said elsewhere, justice involves treating similar things similarly and different things differently. I believe that I've also mentioned the fact that certain particulars--especially certain relations--are not simply circumstantial to acts, but play a part in defining the object of an action. And I am quite certain that I have spelled what I believe to be the connection between justice, relationships, rights and duties. The point being, of course, that the particulars of a situation can play a large part in whether or not an action is just or not, and even whether an act is objectively evil or not.

It is illegitimate to abstract actions away from important particular details so as to attempt to judge an action moral or immoral. One cannot abstract the sexual intercourse between a man and a woman out to nothing more than the physical action in an attempt to argue that fornication is moral since it is no different than the conjugal love between a husband and wife. It is illegitimate to abstract out the act of shooting a gun at another man to simply pointing and pulling the trigger to argue that there is no difference between murder and legitimate self-defense. In both these situation the particular relationship between the agent and the subject is fundamental to the object of the action and the attempt to ignore these particulars by illegitimate abstraction is pure sophistry.

In the same way, it is illegitimate to argue that it is hypocritical to be opposed to the secession of Kosovo from Serbia but to be neutral-leaning-towards-favorable for South Ossatia to secede from Georgia and join the Russian federation. The particular historic and existential details are enormously different in the two cases, and this effects what is the just decision in each. To whit:

Kosovo is an historic part of Serbia. There is no historic basis whatsoever for an independent state of Kosovo. An independent Kosovo does nothing but create a state run by Islamic mafioso in the middle of the one of Christendom's first bulwarks against assault by Jihad.

South Ossetia is not an historic part of Georgia. Indeed, its history supports its separation from Georgia and its close allegiance with Russia. The reason that South Ossetia is a part of Georgia boils down to "because Stalin said so."

These completely different historical relationships make a difference in judging the justice of the two situations. You could say it's hypocrisy to have different views on the independence of Kosovo and South Ossetia, but you'd be wrong.

6 comments:

Anonymous said...

Well, you gotta admit, it is similar in gravity of fallacy as that in the following statement:

"Moreover, why does NATO still exist? The Soviet Union fell, it has served its purpose. What can it do now but antagonize Russia"

Especially considering Russia, itself, happened to have been a member of NATO:



SOURCE: De-Facto Russian Membership Signals the End of NATO


EXCERPT:

Earlier this week at the heavily guarded NATO summit in Rome, the NATO Council of 20 voted unanimously to make Russia its newest partner country. This landmark agreement grants de-facto NATO membership to Russia via its participation in a newly established NATO-Russia Joint Council. The agreement brings Russia into NATO's decision-making structure, which due to the fact that all of the alliance's decisions must be unanimous, grants Russia veto power over most of NATO decisions except those relating to its "mutual defense" role and admission of new members.

brendon said...

I'm sorry, I don't see the fallacy. Perhaps you could spell it out for me? For example, my post is dealing with the fallacy of relative to absolute. In each example someone is arguing that something--be it sex, life, independence or sovereignty--is an absolute good in itself, rather than a good relative to an end--such as the procreation and rearing of children, justice or the common good.

Are you trying to argue that the intention behind the North Atlantic Treaty was not to contain the Soviet Union? Or that the intention behind a law is completely irrelevant? Because, as the post title says, you could say that, but you'd be wrong.

Also, this: "Especially considering Russia, itself, happened to have been a member of NATO," is false. Russia did not sign the North Atlantic Treaty. That Russia and NATO entered into a partnership does not make Russia a member of NATO. And one must wonder why NATO feels the need, if its relationship with Russia is on such good terms, to hem Russia in and place troops and missiles all along her borders?

Anonymous said...

"This landmark agreement grants de-facto NATO membership to Russia "

brendon said...

"This landmark agreement grants de-facto NATO membership to Russia "

Yes, Mr. Pyne's opinion is interesting. But it is also, as far as I can tell, de facto incorrect.

Anonymous said...

FWIW, I do admire the way you make such logical distinctions though -- are you a Scholastic, by any chance?

brendon said...

I should probably note why I believe Mr. Pyne to be incorrect. The answer lies in his third sentence: "The agreement brings Russia into NATO's decision-making structure, which due to the fact that all of the alliance's decisions must be unanimous, grants Russia veto power over most of NATO decisions except those relating to its 'mutual defense' role and admission of new members." It is precisely the admittance of new members to NATO and their "mutual defense" that bothers Russia so much, since it is this that gives NATO the excuse to place missiles and troops all along the Russian border. What he is saying boils down to, "Russia is a member of NATO except with regard to all the ways that NATO affects and poses a threat to Russian interests." Some membership.

Am I a scholastic? I suppose so, at least insofar as I am a Thomist and Thomists are usually considered to Scholastics.

Thank you for the compliment about drawing distinctions. All the philosophy professors I've had who taught me anything worth knowing taught me that one of the most important things for a philosopher to do is draw clear and true distinctions. It is not always easy, but it is something one must strive for if one wishes to become a precise and correct thinker.

I also should note that if it seems that I am not struggling in the drawing of these distinctions it is because I have done so in private, through reading, thinking, and discussions with friends and family. Not all the thought I put into various issues appears on this blog, though such thoughts obviously inform the posts that appear here.